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ABSTRACT 
 
Corruption and lack of transparency go hand in hand in poor countries. As most corrupt countries in the 
world can be found on the African continent, these countries have become a main target for strategies with 
anti-corruption movements. Despite the widespread phenomenon of corruption in this area, the technology 
development is prosperous, and owning a mobile phone is more common than having a toilet. This study 
considers the case of Kenya, which is one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in the world. Over the 
last seven years the country has faced a radical shift from the traditional financial banking system towards 
a financial system based on an electronic platform. The platform, named M-Pesa, provides mobile phone-
based payment and transfer services for everyone with a mobile phone. This technological innovation has 
had a tremendous success with users countrywide. As a result of this development, this paper examines 
how the large-scale mobile phone-based payment system is used, and attempts to empirically test if it has 
been a successful strategy to decrease corruption in Kenya. The relationship can be explained by public 
choice theory, but this study reveals that the Kenyan context of corruption may be seen as being within a 
collective choice framework where the cost of fighting corruption outweighs the benefits. The paper applies 
microeconomic data on two hundred households with the aim of developing a model, which is then linked to 
the adoption of M-Pesa and to its impact. The aim of this paper is to give a deeper understanding of how 
M-Pesa affects economic growth in terms of reducing corruption. The results of testing the relationship 
between M-Pesa and corruption yield some but not full supportive empirical evidence for the hypothesis in 
this study.  
 
Keywords: Kenya, Mobile Banking, M-Pesa, Public and Private sector, Corruption, Anti-Corruption Efforts, Economic Growth, 
Technology Innovation   
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CONVERSIONS  
100 KES = 7.42 SEK = 1.13 USD 
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SIDA   Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency  
GCB   Global Corruption Barometer  
KACC   Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission  
ESCC   Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission 
ICC   International Criminal Court  
CAJ   The Commission on Administrative Justice  
EAC   East African Community 
FDI   Foreign Direct Investments 
ICT   Information and Communication Technology  
SSA   Sub-Saharan Africa 
CCK   Communications Commission of Kenya 
ISCO  International Standard Classification of Occupations  
ISCED  International Standard Classification of Education  
OLS   Ordinary Least squared  
LPM  Linear probability model  
UNESCO United Nation’s organization for education, science and culture  
LR  Likelihood ratio method 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
This chapter contains a brief description of mobile banking and corruption along with a presentation of the 
relationship as well as the outline of the thesis. 
 
 
If you sometime in the last year have been involved in the culture of bribery and grants, you are not the only 
one. In 2013 more than a quarter of the world’s population paid a bribe in terms of money or gifts to the 
public platform.1 In addition, more than six billion people of the world’s population had access to a mobile 
phone compared to only four and a half billion people that had access to a toilet in 2013.2 In Kenya around 
70 per cent of the population had mobile phone subscriptions and according to the World Bank the phones 
were mainly used for the mobile payment system called M-Pesa rather than other applications.3,4 The 
extent of M-Pesa in Kenya might have big potential to replace cash and disclose the lack of transparency, 
increase accountability and in turn remove opportunities for corrupt.5 
 
This paper evaluates if the mobile programme, M-Pesa, has an impact on corruption in Kenya. M-Pesa is a 
financial system built on an electronic platform providing a mobile phone-based payment and a transfer 
service to everyone with a mobile phone. The services are based on e-floats allowing individuals to deposit, 
send and withdraw money by using their mobile phones.6 Safaricom first implemented M-Pesa in Kenya 
2007 and rapidly received over 50 000 subscribers. Today, 19.42 million of the Kenyan population use M-
Pesa, and around 8.9 billion US dollars has been transferred since the beginning.7,8,9 The amount of the 
transactions is equal to 43 per cent of Kenya´s GDP.10 This explosive growth can also be observed in the 
extent of M-Pesa agents countrywide. In 2007 Safaricom operated about 355 agents and in 2011 more 
than 27 000 agents were located across Kenya.11 The fast adoption of M-Pesa, combined with a lack of 
financial services in Kenya, has given rise to an effective alternative to the traditional banking system.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Hardoon, D. and Heinrich, F., (2013), Global Corruption Barometer 2013, Transparency International, 
http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2013_globalcorruptionbarometer_en?e=2496456/3903358#search 
2 UN News Centre, (2013), Deputy UN chief calls for urgent action to tackle global sanitation crisis, United Nation News Center, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44452&Cr=sanitation&Cr1=#.U3nimTnwK9P 
3The World Bank, Mobile cellular subscriptions, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS.P2 
4 Candall, A., Otieno, A., Mutuku, L., Colaco, J., Grosskurth, J., and Otieno, P., (2012), Mobile Phone Usage at the Kenyan Base of the Pyramid, iHub Research 
and Research Solutions Africa, http://blogs.worldbank.org/ic4d/files/ic4d/mobile_phone_usage_kenyan_base_pyramid.pdf 
5Krolikowski, A., Fu, X., and Hope, R,. (2013), Wireless Water: Improving Urban Water Provision Through Mobile Finance Innovations, 
ttp://oxwater.co.uk/#/mobile-water-payments/4559323117 
6Suri, T. and Jack, W., (2011), Mobile Money: The Economics of M-PESA, NBER Working Paper No. 16721 
7Safaricom, (2013), Safaricom Limited Annual Report,, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/Resources_Downloads/Annual_Report.pdf 
8Safaricom, Video: A Journey that Kenyans have chosen, http://nchinampesa.safaricom.co.ke/#scroll, 
9Safaricom, Timeline, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/mpesa_timeline/timeline.html 
10Safaricom, Nchi na Safaricom M-PESA ,http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/nchi-na-safaricom-m-pesa, 
11Safaricom, M-PESA Customer and Agent Numbers, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/Personal/M-PESA/m-pesa_statistics_-_2.pdf 
12Michaels, L., (2011), It’s Better Than Cash: Kenya Mobile Money Market Assessment, Accenture, 
https://communities.usaidallnet.gov/ictforag/bitcache/21ac0850dc58d2fb5cb8cb2b99332b6b8d6b2151?vid=220&disposition=attachment&op=download 
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This new mobile phone based banking system may reduce the use of cash in Kenya and therefor be a step 
towards a reduction of corruption.   
 
Despite that corruption is only characterized by negative challenges for countries, there is no question that 
corruption is a widespread phenomenon existing around the world, especially across undeveloped 
economies. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) defines corruption as the 
abuse of entrusted power conducted by authorities, institutions and governments. Corruption includes for 
instance receiving bribes with the aim of performing a favour as well as obtaining unfair advantages or 
benefits for someone else. These beneficial services are in general related to individual’s position, power 
and work duties.13  
 
Kenya has been described as one of the most corrupted economies in the Sub-Saharan region since its 
independence from Great Britain 1963. Thus, in recent years the country has experienced a period 
characterized by reforms and rules of law legislated with the aim of bringing major gains in terms of 
controlling corruption. As the president Kibaki won the 2002 election with an anti-corruption agenda, the 
country faced a radical shift towards a democratic nature with different anti-corruption strategies. However, 
within two years after the election different corruption scandals followed each other and the credibility of the 
government decreased.14 According to the Corruption perception index for 2013, Kenya was ranked 136 
out of 175 corrupt countries.15 
 
Corruption is seen as a social phenomenon in traditional economic theory. According to the public choice 
approach as well as the neo-institutional model, the lack of transparency and information is the key factor in 
economic crimes such as bribery and grants. However, by introducing the mobile innovations, the spatial 
and temporal money barriers might be eliminated depending on the behaviour of the actors. At the same 
time our study observes that the Kenyan context of corruption can instead be viewed in a collective choice 
framework. This model states that the cost of fighting corruption outweighs the benefits, which makes it 
hard for the mobile platform to disclose the corruption-related activities.16,17  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13Sida, The Communication Departement, (2013) Corruption affects development, http://www.sida.se/English/About-us/How-we-operate/Our-Work-Against-
Corruption/, 
14Anti-Corruption Resource Center: http://www.u4.no/publications/kenya-overview-of-corruption-and-anti%20corruption/downloadasset/3114 
15Transparancy International, Corruption Perception Index 2013, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results 
16Morawczynski, O., and Pickens, M., (2009), Poor People Using Mobile Financial Services: Observations on Custumer Usage and Impact from M-PESA, CGAP 
Publication, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9492/503060BRI0Box31MPESA1Brief01PUBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1 
17Persson, A., Rothstein, B., and Teorell, J., (2010), The failure of Anti-Corruption Policies A Theoretical Mischaracterization of the Problem, QoG Working Paper 
Series 2010:19, SIDA: https://www.sida.se/PageFiles/39460/Failure%20Anti_Corruption%20policy%20(2).pdf 
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Corruption and M-Pesa are two areas where there has been widespread research presented but the 
relationship between these two terms is not observed to the same extent. However, there are two studies, 
conducted in Afghanistan and Tanzania, showing that mobile phone payment can be an anti-corruption 
alternative. The former analyses the relationship by observing the change of a policeman’s salary before 
and after the implementation of the mobile system. The latter estimates the impact of the mobile-based 
system in terms of payments for public provided services in order to analyse if the mobile platform can be 
used for decreasing corrupt-related activities.18,19 
 
In this paper we will investigate the situation in Kenya and if the mobile banking system may be a 
successful strategy against corruption. In order to investigate this relationship we will perform regressions 
based on individual level data from Kenya. The aim of this research is to identify the possible patterns of 
change in corruption since the implementation of M-Pesa in Kenya.   
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section two the aim of this paper as well as our research limit is 
presented. In section three we present background information on Kenya and the current situation in terms 
of economic growth as well as the country’s role in the world. In sections four and five we separately define 
and generally explain the mobile banking system, M-Pesa as well as the different forms of corruption. 
Furthermore we also describe the situation of the mobile system and corruption in more detail for the case 
of Kenya. In section six we go through the theoretical framework that observes the relationship between M-
Pesa and the corruption in Kenya. Section seven reviews previous literature on the impact of M-Pesa on 
different economic factors. The methodology and estimation strategy are presented and discussed in the 
following section. The database and a summary of the sample are also given. Section nine contains the 
results and finally section ten summarizes the findings on the impact of the use of M-Pesa on corruption. 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
 
This chapter covers an explanation of the question, which will be analysed along with arguments for 
conducting the thesis in Kenya. 
 
 
In this paper we aim to answer the question “Can mobile banking reduce the presence of corruption in 
Kenya?” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Maurer, B., Chipchase, J., and Lee, P., (2011), Mobile Money: Afghanistan, innovations / volume 6, number 2, 
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/INOV_a_00067 
19 Krolikowski, A., Fu, X., and Hope, R,. (2013), Wireless Water: Improving Urban Water Provision Through Mobile Finance Innovations, 
http://oxwater.co.uk/#/mobile-water-payments/4559323117 
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Mobile banking, that is using your mobile phone to do bank services, has been a success in Sub-Sahara 
Africa (SSA) in terms of the number of users and easy access to financial services. It has also been 
suggested that this technical development might democratize the public sector as well as the private 
because mobile banking limits the use of cash and therefor makes it easier to “follow the money” since it 
leaves a digital print. 20 This suggested development would be very interesting since Africa, and especially 
SSA, is one of the most corrupt parts of the world.  
 
We have chosen to investigate the relationship between mobile banking and corruption in Kenya, since 
Kenya is one of the most corrupt countries in the world and M-Pesa, which is the name of the mobile 
banking system in Kenya, is the most successful banking system in SSA. In addition, the mobile banking 
system in SSA was first established in Kenya and was launched by Safaricom in March 2007. 21,22  
 
We have decided to limit our study to M-Pesa even though there was a new service launched in 2012 
called M-Shwari. The reason for the limitation is that M-Shwari was recently introduced to the market and 
there is not yet sufficient information available.  
 
3. A SNAPSHOT FROM KENYA 
 
 
A short summary of the history of Kenya will be presented in this chapter along with some basic information 
that characterizes the country and its politics. 
 
 
The official name today is Republic of Kenya and the 580 000 km2 large country is located in Sub-Saharan 
Africa with Somalia, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan as 
bordering countries. In total there are approximately 44 million 
inhabitants, which is about average for African countries. 3.4 million 
of the country’s inhabitants live in the capital Nairobi. In addition, 
the population is relative young and more than 40 per cent are 
under the age of fourteen.23  
Kenya is one of the world´s poorest countries and almost 45 per cent of the Kenyan population live below 
the poverty line. Despite this, Kenya has had a steady economic growth with an annual increase of five to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20Buku, M., Meredith, M., (2013), Safaricom and M-PESA in Kenya: Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity, Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts 
Volume 8, Issue 3, https://digital.law.washington.edu/dspacelaw/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1204/8WJLTA375.pdf?sequence=5 
21T.S, (2013), Why does Kenya lead the world in mobile money?, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-
explains-18, 
22Buku, M., Meredith, M., (2013), Safaricom and M-PESA in Kenya: Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity, Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts 
Volume 8, Issue 3, https://digital.law.washington.edu/dspacelaw/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1204/8WJLTA375.pdf?sequence=5 
23The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html 
Figure 1: Map over Kenya 
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six per cent the last five years. As a result, the income gap has increased rapidly among the inhabitants 
and the richest 10 per cent of the population earn approximately 44 per cent of the national income 
compared to the bottom 10 per cent that only earn less than one per cent.24  
 
In 1885 Kenya was under German rule but only a few years later it became a British colony and was 
officially named British East Africa. After an 11 year long war of independence against the British 
colonialism starting in 1952 with the mau-mau Rebellion, Kenya became an independent nation in 1963. 
The Independence Day is celebrated on 12 December.25 Since freedom, over 40 different ethnic groups 
have characterized Kenya. In recent years there have been several divergences of the groups ending up in 
ethnic violence with numerous causalities.26  
 
Education is one of the most important goals for the government in Kenya with the aim of becoming a 
middle-income country in 2030. In order to achieve the goal, Kenya has made primary and secondary 
school free for everyone. This has resulted in a rapid increase of people being educated and in 2013 
almost three million more children were enrolled in primary school in comparison with 2003. This is an 
increase corresponding to 46 per cent. As a result of these investments, almost 90 per cent of the 
population, older than 15 years, are today able to read and write. However this positive process is also 
marked by some consequences such as pressure on the teaching force, the quality of education given as 
well as infrastructure.27  
 
The current government has invested in infrastructure to increase the possibility of trade. However, the 
investments have been too low and for this reason Kenya’s position as the largest economy in East Africa 
is vulnerable. Almost 18 million of the population are included in the Kenyan labour force but the 
unemployment rate is still approximately 40 per cent. Furthermore, the prevailing economic growth and 
development are a consequence of donations and lenders from abroad. The tourist industry is important 
and Kenya with its beautiful landscape and animal life is a popular safari destination. The reputation has 
however been threatened due to recent terror attacks in the surrounding areas.28 Other issues Kenya is 
dealing with are criminality, poverty and droughts that millions of people suffer from regularly.29,30   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24UNICEF, Kenya at a glance, http://www.unicef.org/kenya/overview_4616.html 
25Swedish Government, Kenya, http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2574/a/75489 
26Utrikespolitiska institutet, Landguiden Kenya, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Kenya/Befolkning-Sprak 
27US Agency for International Development, Kenya: Education, http://www.usaid.gov/kenya/education 
28 The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html 
29 BBC News Africa, Kenya profile, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13681341 
30 The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html 
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Kenya, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Ghana are called the African KING countries since they are considered to 
be the frontier markets in Sub Saharan Africa.31  In addition, Kenya and other east African countries also 
established a common market in 2010, called East African Community, EAC, to be more independent and 
not rely on aid from the rest of the world. The agreement has given possibilities to increase exports as well 
as foreign direct investments, FDI. The expectation is that this will stimulate the economic growth as well as 
development of Kenya.32   
 
Kenya has a republican government form and a presidential election takes place every fifth year. Uhuru 
Kenyatta has been president since April 2013, as he won the election and replaced former president Mwai 
Kibaki. The election was peaceful compared to the post-election in 2007, which led to countrywide violence 
where almost 1500 were killed and 300 000 became homeless. The post-election violence ended when the 
new constitution was established. However, both President Kenyatta and vice-president William Ruto are 
currently being charged by the international Criminal Court for different crimes related to the post-election 
violence of 2007. The Kenyans see this prosecution as a milestone for the lack of legal action related to 
high civil servants. This incident, with the new constitution and a reformed judicial system have exposed 
several economic as well as corruption crimes and hopefully the country will face a future with a democratic 
system.33  
 
4. MOBILE PHONE MARKET IN AFRICA   
 
 
In this chapter the mobile market in Sub-Saharan Africa is introduced. It contains a preamble to the 
successful mobile banking platform in Kenya, and an example of how M-Pesa has disclosed the lack of 
transparency.  
 
 
4.1 The extent of mobile money in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The adoption of mobile phones has been miraculous and has occurred worldwide at the fastest rate ever 
observed in technology history. For the radio to obtain 50 million users it took 50 years. To reach the same 
number of users it took television 13 years and the Internet seven. For the mobile phone it only took three 
years and today the number of subscribers has reached approximately seven billion.34 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Kenne, B., (2014), Kenya, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, And Ghana: The African KINGs, http://seekingalpha.com/article/1954601-kenya-ivory-coast-nigeria-and-ghana-
the-african-kings 
32Swedish Government, Kenya, http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2574/a/75489 
33Ibid 
34Buku, M., Meredith, M., (2013), Safaricom and M-PESA in Kenya: Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity, Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts 
Volume 8, Issue 3, https://digital.law.washington.edu/dspacelaw/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1204/8WJLTA375.pdf?sequence=5 
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 The mobile technology has grown rapidly in SSA since the beginning of the century. In 2008 over 60 per 
cent of the people had mobile phone coverage, which can be compared with approximately 30 per cent in 
2000. During the corresponding period of time the number of mobile phone subscribers increased from 16 
million to 276 million.35  
 
The growth of the mobile phone market in poor countries of SSA has exceeded all expectations. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, there were 253 million subscribers in total the same 
year, which means there has been an annual growth of 18 per cent in 
five years. The subscribers are forecasted to reach 346 million by 2017, 
which would correspond to an annual growth of 43 per cent between 
2012 and 2017. In addition, according to the World Bank data 2013, 16 
per cent of the population in Sub-Saharan African used their mobile 
phones for financial transactions. The corresponding number in the rest 
of the developing world was three per cent.36 
 
4.2 Mobile phone market – the case of Kenya 
Kenya is far ahead of other African countries when it comes to technological innovations. Investments and 
market regulations to improve the mobile sector and develop the technology infrastructure have increased 
rapidly last year. In 2012 the mobile market represented more than 20 per cent of the contribution to the 
Kenyan Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector.37  
 
Kenya is generally seen as the global leader of mobile money. This title became concrete as the Kenyan 
telecom companies were established. The first publicly owned mobile phone companies in Kenya were 
introduced in the beginning of the 1990s but were only conventional to a small extent in the initial stage.38 
In the introduction stage the main company operating on the market was Safaricom, which today is the 
largest company on the Kenyan mobile market. Safaricom is currently privately owned and has 
strengthened its market role since the successful establishment of M-Pesa. The company has recently 
increased its annual market share by approximately 2 per cent points. Presently it corresponds to more 
than 65 per cent of the market share with 20 million subscribers. In addition, the mobile operator regulates 
over 90 per cent of the total amount of mobile text massages and approximately 80 per cent of the voice 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35Hardoon, D. and Heinrich, F., (2013), Global Corruption Barometer 2013, Transparency International 
36Asli, D. K., and Klapper, L., (2012), “Measuring financial inclusion: The global index database.” World bank policy research working paper 6025, 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6025 
37iHubResearch, (2012), The insider’s guide to mobile Web/ marketing in Kenya http://www.ihub.co.ke/ihubresearch/uploads/2012/july/1343053407_819_604.pdf 
38 Suri, T,. and Jack, W., (2009), Mobile Money: The Economics of M-PESA, GSMA, p.4 http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/economics_MPESA.pdf 
Figure 2: Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people 	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traffic in Kenya.39 This places the mobile operator significantly ahead of its nearest competitors.40 There are 
three rivals that also have launched a mobile program in terms of mobile money. The second largest mobile 
operator after Safaricom is Airtel with 5.5 million subscribers accounting for 18 per cent of the market share 
and the third largest is Essar operating under the name yuMobile, which has 2.7 million subscribers 
corresponding to 9 per cent of the market.41,42 Orange is the smallest operator of the country´s four mobile 
operators with 7 per cent corresponding to 2.2 million subscribers.43 
 
4.3 The financial sector of Kenya 
It is difficult to get a correct proportion of the population formally “unbanked” in Kenya, but it was estimated 
to be close to 80 per cent in 2009. Kenya is traditionally observed as a cash-based economy where the 
estimation is that 95 per cent of the financial transactions are being handled with cash.44 Even though a 
majority of the population is unbanked, there are still options for individuals that are included in the banking 
sector. In total there are 44 operating banks in Kenya, out of which 31 are owned locally and the remaining 
are foreign owned. Together the financial institutions that are locally owned comprise 27 commercial banks, 
three banks that have the Government of Kenya and State Corporations as shareholders and one 
institution for mortgage in housing finance.45  
  
The situation in Kenya is typical for underdeveloped countries where the financial issues are solved in an 
informal way because people in this part of the world usually lack a bank account.46 This informal way is 
not convenient, safe or in connection with the rest of the world. In order to reach economic vitality it is 
essential to provide financial services to a large part of the population.47 Mobile banking is considered to 
work as a solution in order to simplify entry to the banking industry. Financial services offered through 
mobile phones are not different from traditional banking channels, and should rather be seen as branchless 
banking. 48  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39Wachira, C., (2014), Safaricom May Meet Regulator’s Network Demand With Essar Buy (1), Bloomberg News, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-03-
07/safaricom-may-meet-regulator-s-demands-on-network-with-essar-buy 
40Buku, M., Meredith, M., (2013), Safaricom and M-PESA in Kenya: Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity, Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts 
Volume 8, Issue 3, https://digital.law.washington.edu/dspacelaw/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1204/8WJLTA375.pdf?sequence=5 
41Wachira, C., (2014), Safaricom May Meet Regulator’s Network Demand With Essar Buy, Bloomberg News, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-
07/safaricom-may-meet-regulator-s-demands-on-network-with-essar-buy.html 
42Vikas, SN., (2014), Aritel Kenya Seeks Approval TO Acquire Essar’s yuMobile, http://www.medianama.com/2014/03/223-airtel-kenya-yumobile/ 
43Okutoyi, E., (2014), France Telecom reviewing Orange Kenya, Uganda operations, ItWebAfrica, http://www.itwebafrica.com/mobile/309-kenya/232557-france-
telecom-reviewing-orange-kenya-uganda-operations 
44 Michaels, L., (2011), It’s Better Than Cash: Kenya Mobile Money Market Assessment, Accenture, http://www.merchantpro.co/betterthancash.pdf 
45 The Central Bank of Kenya, Commercial Banks & Mortgage Finance Institutions 
46Asli, D. K., and Klapper, L., (2012), “Measuring financial inclusion: The global index database.” World bank policy research working paper 6025, 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6025  
47 Mutsune, T., (2014), No Kenyan left behind: The case of financial inclusion through mobile banking, Global Conference on Business and Finance Proceedings, 
Vol. 9,Nr. 1 
48 Ibid.  
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When mobile banking was introduced in Kenya it was called the “first product in the world that allows 
unbanked, with no banking details, no registration, no bank account, no credit card, to do banking.”49 The 
service is considered to be the primary element to the organization of economic movement, risk 
management and other related issues.50  
 
4.4 M-Pesa  
M-Pesa was developed by Vodafone and launched by Safaricom as recently as 2007, but it has rapidly 
grown countrywide due to the system’s convenience and effectiveness. Furthermore, the Kenyan Central 
Bank has licensed M-Pesa as a “non-banking financial service”, which means that the mobile programme is 
not subject to the rules of law or regulated as other banks.51  
 
By using the slogan “Send money home” Safaricom has facilitate the way of transferring money between 
individuals.52 Before M-Pesa was launched, the money was delivered either by hand or through friends. 
Another option was to give a bus driver the money, a system which most commonly required the receiver to 
wait at a bus station in order to pick up the cash.53 Instead of transferring money through unsecure ways, 
M-Pesa became a successful alternative for handling money. The revolutionary system enables customers 
to access financial services through mobile phone messaging. More specifically, the mobile programme 
allows transfer of money between phones through the Safaricom network in terms of SMS.  The typical 
interactions for M-Pesa include payments, salaries, airtime and deposits or withdrawals using an M-Pesa 
outlet. Local M-Pesa agents and independent agents such as shop, kiosk and petrol stations provide these 
services.54  
 
4.4.1 How to register for M-Pesa 
In order to use M-Pesa one needs to be registered for a M-Pesa SIM card at authorised M-Pesa agents. 
The registration is free of charge and one is required to show valid identification. Important to note is that 
one does not have to own a mobile phone in order to become a M-Pesa user. It is enough to register for a 
M-Pesa SIM card since the card is not linked to a specific phone.55,56  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Mutsune, T., (2014), No Kenyan left behind: The case of financial inclusion through mobile banking, Global Conference on Business and Finance Proceedings, 
Vol. 9,Nr. 1 
50 Ibid 
51Maitrot, M. and Foster, C., (2012), Use of technology in delivering social protection: The Case of M-PESA, University Press Limited (UPL) with PPRC and 
UNDP Bangladesh, http://infomediation.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/maitrot-and-foster-2013-use-of-technology-in-delivering-social-protection.pdf 
52 Heyer, A. and Mas, I., (2009), Seeking Fertile Grounds for Mobile Money, GSMA- Mobile Banking for the unbanked, 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/fertile_grounds_mobile_money55.pdf 
53 Suri, T. and Jack, W., (2014), Risk Sharing and Transactions Costs: Evidence from Kenya’s Mobile Money Revolution, American Economic Review. Feb2014, 
Vol. 104 Issue 1 
54Maitrot, M. and Foster, C., (2012), Use of technology in delivering social protection: The Case of M-PESA, University Press Limited (UPL) with PPRC and 
UNDP Bangladesh, http://infomediation.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/maitrot-and-foster-2013-use-of-technology-in-delivering-social-protection.pdf 
55Safaricom, How to register for M-PESA, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/my-m-pesa-account/how-to-register-for-m-pesa 
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4.4.2 M-Pesa services   
As stated above, M-Pesa allows one to access financial services such as payments, transactions between 
individuals, airtime, cash deposits in one’s M-Pesa account as well as withdrawals.57  The maximum 
amount in a M-Pesa account is 100 000 Kenyan shillings corresponding to 1129 US dollars. The method of 
depositing cash into an M-Pesa account is easy. The process is built on registered M-Pesa users deposing 
money with Safaricom agents and in return the users receive an e-float, also called e-money, in an 
electronic M-Pesa account connected to the mobile phone number. This e-money can then be used for 
different transactions. One can also deposit money directly into another person’s M-Pesa account at an M-
Pesa agent outlet.58,59,60  
 
In order to transfer money between individuals, the sender is the only one required to have an M-Pesa 
account; i.e., the receiver does not have to be a Safaricom subscriber. The process is built on the sender 
tapping the receiver’s phone number and amount of money to be transferred. When the transfer is 
accepted by the Safaricom network system, the money is transferred. If the receiver has a M-Pesa account, 
he/she will obtain a message including the new balance on the M-Pesa account. If the receiver does not 
have a M-Pesa account, he/she will obtain a message about the transfer; he/she will then need to go to an 
agent in order to redeem the money.61,62 The maximum amount of money that may be transferred is 140 
000 Kenyan shillings (1580 US dollars) daily and 70 000 Kenyan shillings (790 US dollars) per 
transaction.63 
 
One may also withdraw money from the M-Pesa account through an ATM or a M-Pesa agent. Then the e-
float will be converted to real money. In order to withdraw one needs to transfer the amount of money to the 
M-Pesa agent. When the transaction is verified by the Safaricom network system, the agent will receive an 
approval message and can provide the cash for the user. If one is not a Safaricom subscriber, one needs to 
show the message saying that one has received the money and when the agent verifies the transaction the 
cash can be obtained.64 One can also withdraw money from an ATM assuming that one is a M-Pesa 
subscriber when any one of PesaPoint, Equity Bank, Diamond Trust Bank, KCB, Family Bank or NIC BANK 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56Maitrot, M. and Foster, C., (2012), Use of technology in delivering social protection: The Case of M-PESA, University Press Limited (UPL) with PPRC and 
UNDP Bangladesh, http://infomediation.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/maitrot-and-foster-2013-use-of-technology-in-delivering-social-protection.pdf 
57Safaricom, M-PESA service tariffs, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/m-pesa-services-tariffs 
58Safaricom, M-PESA account tariffs, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/my-m-pesa-account/tariffs 
59Safaricom, Deposit Cash to Your Account, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/m-pesa-services-tariffs/m-pesa-person-to-person/deposit-cash-to-your-
account 
60Safaricom, M-PESA service tariffs, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/m-pesa-services-tariffs 
61Maitrot, M. and Foster, C., (2012), Use of technology in delivering social protection: The Case of M-PESA, University Press Limited (UPL) with PPRC and 
UNDP Bangladesh, http://infomediation.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/maitrot-and-foster-2013-use-of-technology-in-delivering-social-protection.pdf 
62Safaricom, Send (transfer) money, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/m-pesa-services-tariffs/m-pesa-person-to-person/send-transfer-money 
63Safaricom, My M-PESA account-tariffs, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/my-m-pesa-account/tariffs 
64Maitrot, M. and Foster, C., (2012), Use of technology in delivering social protection: The Case of M-PESA, University Press Limited (UPL) with PPRC and 
UNDP Bangladesh, http://infomediation.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/maitrot-and-foster-2013-use-of-technology-in-delivering-social-protection.pdf 
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controls the ATM.  In order to use the ATM withdrawal service one needs to select ¨Withdraw Cash from 
ATM¨ on the P-Mesa menu in the phone. After one receives a SMS from M-Pesa with a 6-digit code that is 
used on the ATM, one can obtain the cash.65  
 
M-Pesa subscribers can also use the mobile programme to pay bills. Close to 300 companies, 
organizations and institutions offer a mobile platform where they give their customers the opportunity to pay 
their bills and premiums through the mobile payment system. One can pay bills directly from the M-Pesa 
menu on the phone or at a M-Pesa outlet. The companies may charge customers for paying bills through 
M-Pesa.66,67   
 
In addition Safaricom has customer fees for some services provided through M-Pesa. These charges 
depend on the amount transferred as well as which function is used. The fees are presented in Kenyan 
shillings and are summarized below. 
Transaction value     Transaction type and fee   
Min Max Transaction to M-Pesa Subscribers Transaction to non M-Pesa subscribers Withdraw from M-Pesa agent 
10 49 3 N/A N/A 
50 100 5 N/A 10 
101 500 27 66 27 
501 1000 33 66 27 
1001 1500 33 66 27 
1501 2500 33 66 27 
2501 3500 33 88 49 
35001 5000 33 105 66 
5001 7500 55 143 82 
7501 10000 55 171 110 
10001 15000 55 220 159 
15001 20000 55 237 176 
20001 25000 82 275 187 
25001 30000 82 275 187 
30001 35000 82 275 187 
25001 40000 82 N/A 275 
45001 50000 110 N/A 275 
50001 70000 110 N/A 330 
Table 1:  Fees for M-Pesa 
Transaction Value   Transaction type and fee 
 Min Max Withdraw from ATM 
200 2500 33 
2501 5000 66 
5001 10000 110 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65Safaricom, Withdraw Cash, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/my-m-pesa-account/tariffs 
66Camner, G and Sjöblom, E, (2009), “Can the success of M-PESA be repeated?”, http://emil.sjoblom.com/pdf/M-Pesa_implementations_Ke_Tz.pdf 
67Buku, M., Meredith, M., (2013), Safaricom and M-PESA in Kenya: Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity, Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts 
Volume 8, Issue 3, https://digital.law.washington.edu/dspacelaw/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1204/8WJLTA375.pdf?sequence=5 
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Table 2:  Fees for M-Pesa 
Other Services Fee 
Deposits Free 
Registration for M-Pesa Free 
Buy Airtime Free 
M-Pesa Balance Enquiry 1 
Table 3:  Fees for M-Pesa 
 
In our sample, the most used function of M-Pesa, by almost 90 per cent of the respondents, was 
transferring money to other people. In addition, approximately 73 per cent of the respondents were using 
M-Pesa for buying airtime. The third most common function was to pay bills through M-Pesa, which was 
used by more than half of the sample. This presented in table 4.  
Table41: Summary over the use of M-Pesa 
 
4.5 The success of M-Pesa  
In the initial stage of M-Pesa the main promotion was towards the urban and rural people due to the 
transfer facilitates of sending money over a long distance. However, M-pesa has grown fast and has 
become an important payment and transaction instrument for the whole Kenyan population. The customers 
appreciate the system due to its easy access, reasonable price, credibility and flexibility in comparison to 
other options.68  
 
Since Safaricom introduced M-Pesa to the market, the system has covered transactions to a value of 8.9 
billion US dollars. In addition, the mobile service reached nearly 70 % of the Kenyan population with 17 
million active users in 2013.69,70  
 
Furthermore, the retail agents of M-Pesa have increased by almost the same extent as the mobile system. 
This is because the customer base became larger, which in turn increased the demand for agents. From a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Heyer, A. and Mas, I., (2009), Seeking Fertile Grounds for Mobile Money, GSMA- Mobile Banking for the unbanked, 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/fertile_grounds_mobile_money55.pdf 
69Safaricom, M-Pesa timeline, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/mpesa_timeline/timeline.html 
70Asli, D. K., and Klapper, L., (2012), “Measuring financial inclusion: The global index database.” World bank policy research working paper 6025, 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6025 
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base in 2007, which is presented by the picture on the left in figure 3, Safaricom operated about 355 
agents. In the beginning of 2011 more than 27 000 agents were located in diverse sectors across Kenya, 
which can be observed in the picture on the right in figure 3.71 The darker spots correspond to the newer 
agents. In addition, there were five times more M-Pesa agents than post offices in Kenya in 2013.72,73 
 
Figure 3: M-Pesa Agents across the country 
 
As stated above, Kenya is the leader on the mobile money market, and since M-Pesa is the most 
widespread system in the country it has been studied in order to see what made it so successful. In general 
observers conclude that this can be explained by the fact that a large part of the population have limited 
alternatives to financial services, and at the same time many individuals migrate to bigger Kenyan cities in 
order to find a job and keep a financial link with their families. Furthermore the main operator on the market, 
Safaricom, has a large network and large market share in combination with high density of mobile phone 
owners in the country. Another reason for success is that the decision makers were ready to learn from 
what happened with the new service.74 
 
4.6 The mobile market and the role of the government  
The Kenyan government plays an important role for the mobile market in terms of regulations and policies. 
Both the Central Bank of Kenya and the government are supporting the mobile sector and encouraging fair 
business competition on the market. They also promote and invest in the mobile sector, which has been 
essential for contributing technology innovations. In addition, they have implemented favourable polices 
which have been essential for the success of the mobile based financial system. The main public 
departments, which control the mobile market, are the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK), 
Kenya ICT board and the Ministry of Information and communication.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71Safaricom, M-PESA Customer and Agent Numbers, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/Personal/M-PESA/m-pesa_statistics_-_2.pdf 
72Buku, M., Meredith, M., (2013), Safaricom and M-PESA in Kenya: Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity, Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts 
Volume 8, Issue 3, https://digital.law.washington.edu/dspacelaw/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1204/8WJLTA375.pdf?sequence=5 
73Suri, T. and Jack, W., (2014), Risk Sharing and Transactions Costs: Evidence from Kenya’s Mobile Money Revolution, American Economic Review. Feb2014, 
Vol. 104 Issue 1 
74 Michaels, L., (2011), It’s Better Than Cash: Kenya Mobile Money Market Assessment, Accenture, http://www.merchantpro.co/betterthancash.pdf 
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There are also other organs using the service with the aim to supply citizens with information, note, 
however that the adoption of mobile phones for this purpose has been relatively slow despite the potential. 
A number of ministries use this information channel and one example of this is the Ministry of Agriculture, 
which collects and sends price information on agricultural products on a daily basis. Also the Kenyan health 
agency, KEMSA, uses mobile phones to improve its customer service through a SMS application. There is 
no standardized development plan for how ministries and other government bodies are supposed to 
develop mobile phone applications; instead they are all developing it on their own. 75 
 
4.7 How mobile phones transform development  
The rapid growth of the mobile phone market and mobile money market has several effects on the society. 
More specifically, by enabling individuals to access financial services through the mobile phone, several 
opportunities arise. It breaks down entry barriers for entrepreneurs to enter the private sector as well as 
enabling a platform creating ideas, business models and communication methods.76 Other ways of how 
mobile money possibly can transform development according to USAID and Citi Bank is that it can 
strengthen an individual’s livelihood and have impact on the reduction of corruption.77  
 
One example of how mobile money is reducing corruption is the people living in Isiolo, a town in Kenya, 
where M-Pesa is simplifying the process for financial transactions. An agreement with the Kenyan 
government has been set up in order to make it easier to pay bills and collect revenue. By this agreement 
the inhabitants in Isiolo can pay their bills by using their mobile phones instead of spending hours travelling 
to the county revenue office. The system is includes public transactions, for instance when buying or 
leasing land and livestock selling and buying. Before Isiolo implemented M-Pesa as an alternative way for 
these services most transactions within the mentioned sectors were marred by corruption, since absence of 
transparency benefits individuals that are dealing under the table and hence perform corrupt activities. 
Through mobile money transactions the system becomes more transparent in business activities, and when 
other sectors also begin using the platform it may also reduce the corruption in those sectors. 78 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75iHubResearch, (2012), The insider’s guide to mobile Web/ marketing in Kenya, , 
http://www.ihub.co.ke/ihubresearch/uploads/2012/july/1343053407_819_604.pdf 
76 US Agency for International Development, Digital Finance,  
http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/15396/Digital%20Finance%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf 
77 US Agency for International Development and Citi Group, (2012), 10 Ways to Accelerate Mobile Money, http://www.citigroup.com/citi/news/data/120612a.pdf 
78 Okpamen, H., (2014), M-Pesa To Ease Bills Remittance For Kenyan Community, http://www.ventures-africa.com/2014/03/m-pesa-to-ease-bills-remittance-for-
kenyan-community/ 
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5. CORRUPTION 
 
 
In this chapter a preamble of the great problems of corruption facing mainly the developing world is given, 
and most essentially the situation in Kenya is described. In addition the anti-efforts performed and their 
results in Kenya are given.  
 
 
5.1 Definition of corruption 
Corruption is a broad and complex term as well as a widespread phenomenon among the countries in the 
world, especially in the most undeveloped nations. Evidence states that corruption is one of the most 
harmful phenomenons for a poor country since corruption affects a country’s social, political and economic 
factors and covers a wide range of prevalence of illegal behaviours. More specifically, corruption does not 
only steal resources from the population but also undermines the economic growth, justice as well as 
decreases trust among the public sector.79,80,81  
 
According to SIDA, corruption is defined as a conflict of interest and abuse of entrusted power conducted 
by authorities, institutions and governments. Specifically, corruption includes among other things receiving 
bribes in terms of payments or gifts to perform a favour as well as obtain self-contained unfair advantages 
or benefits for someone else. These beneficial services are in general related to an individual’s position, 
power and work duties.82  
 
Corruption is generally classified into three different levels: petty and bureaucratic, grand and lastly political 
corruption. These divisions are based on partly the size of the transaction and the volume of money lost, 
and partly in the institution or sector where corruption takes place.83 
 
5.2 Petty and bureaucratic corruption 
In most of the literature covering corruption, petty and bureaucratic corruption is often described as 
common and regular abuse of trust related to relative small bribes. 84  This type of corruption is 
characterized by inefficient and distorted regulations for owners or managers of enterprises, set by the 
lower level of the public sector that generates incentives for bribes. Specifically, enterprises are in a sense 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Transparency International, FAQS on corruption, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption/2/ 
80Lambert-Mogiliansky, A. Majumdar, M. Radner, R. (2007) Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats. Journal of Development 
Economics 83 
81Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2013, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results 
82Swedish International Development and Cooperation Agency, How we work against corruption, http://www.sida.se/English/About-us/How-we-operate/Our-
Work-Against-Corruption/ 
83Transparency International, FAQS on corruption, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption/2/ 
84Lambert-Mogiliansky, A. Majumdar, M. Radner, R. (2007) Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats. Journal of Development 
Economics 83 
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required to make informal facilitation payments to regulatory and administrative officials in order to get 
access to public goods and services. Furthermore, these types of unofficial payments are made to receive 
privileges in authority processes concerning, among other things, trade licences, tax and duties payments 
as well as passport, registration of new firms and preferential laws concerning the rights of workers.85,86 
 
The international finance cooperation (IFC) survey of 2007, provided by the Central Bank, presents 
qualitative and quantitative measures of corruption. This survey indicates that, in 2007, 38 per cent of the 
Kenyan enterprises considered corruption as a major restriction in the public sector, whereas 30 per cent of 
all the firms in Sub-Saharan Africa consider an informal payment to be required. Furthermore, almost 80 
per cent of the firms in Kenya were expected to give unofficial payments in order to get preferential 
bureaucratic services, relative to 42 percent of all the firms in Sub-Saharan Africa.87,88  
 Table 5: Per cent of firms identifying corruption as a major constraint.                    Table 6: Per cent of firms expected to make informal payments in order to get preferential treatment.  
 
5.2.1 Grand Corruption 
The form of corruption defined as grand corruption differs from other classifications of corruption in both the 
extent of the consequences and by the way it functions.89 It is generally defined as the gravest form of 
corruption and occurs at the highest level of the institutional and political sectors that control the central 
functions of the state.90 The grand corruption arises through misusing of the political system for favourable 
treatment by highly positioned politicians and state agents that aim to sustain law and order.91  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85Transparency International, FAQS on corruption, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption/2/ 
86Kenya, (2007), Kenya: Country Profile 2007, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/FPDKM/EnterpriseSurveys/Documents/Profiles/English/Kenya-2007 
87Ibid.  
88Anti-Corruption Resource Center: http://www.u4.no/publications/kenya-overview-of-corruption-and-anti%20corruption/downloadasset/3114 
89Global Organization Of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC), (2013), Prosecuting Grand Corruption as an International Crime,  
http://gopacnetwork.org/Docs/DiscussionPaper_ProsecutingGrandCorruption_EN.pdf 
90Transparency International, FAQS on corruption, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption/2/ 
91Hechler, H., Zinkernagel, G., Koechlin, L., and Morris, D., (2011), Can UNCAC address grand corruption?, U4 Report 2011:2, 
http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4226-can-uncac-address-grand-corruption.pdf 
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5.2.2 Political corruption 
The last form of corruption is called political corruption and is defined to take place among the countries’ 
political parties. In particular, the governments have an influence on the policymaking rules that consider 
the allocation of resources as well as financing. In addition the politicians abuse their position to maintain 
their authority, prestige and wealth. Due to absence of resources and the widespread institutional 
weakness, specifically in undeveloped countries, the political parties have become vulnerable to 
corruption.92    
 
According to the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 2013, close to 53 per cent of the Kenyan respondents 
reported that the political parties were corrupt or extremely corrupt. In addition, 59 per cent of the 
approached citizens perceived that public officials were corrupt or extremely corrupt.93  Furthermore, based 
on a corruption scale, measuring how vulnerable the institutions and authorities are to corruption provided 
by GCB, the Kenyan political parties scored 3.8 on a scale from one to five. One correspondent stated no 
existence of corruption and five stated extreme corruption among the parties.94 
 
5.3 The Consequences of corruption 
Corruption is a complex economic, social as well as political problem and also one of the most damaging 
phenomena for the poorest part of the world. This is because a country characterized by corruption faces 
many different challenges within the state because corruption undermines democratic authorities and the 
financial system in terms of preventing fair rule of law provision as well as distorting electoral processes. 
Additionally, this leads to a lack of legitimacy of the nation and contributes to the absence of transparency 
and credibility of the countries.95 
 
According to presented evidence, poverty and corruption are significantly related.96 The reason for this is 
that the world lowers or suspends the aid to corrupt states; the aid is given to improve the state and the 
living conditions for the individuals. In addition, corruption lowers foreign investment, limits the access to 
basic public services and increases the cost of the delivery of the services. Furthermore, this in turn may 
lead to a decrease in the countries growth and human development.97,98 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92Anti-Corruption Resource Center: http://www.u4.no/publications/kenya-overview-of-corruption-and-anti%20corruption/downloadasset/3114 
93Transparency International, Global Corruption barometer (GCB) 2013: http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=kenya   
94Ibid 
95Lambert-Mogiliansky, A. Majumdar, M. Radner, R. (2007) Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats. Journal of Development 
Economics 83.    
96Sida The Communication Department, (2013) Corruption affects development, http://www.sida.se/English/About-us/How-we-operate/Our-Work-Against-
Corruption/ 
97European Commission, (2008), Budget support- The effective way to finance development?, European Communities, 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/budgetsupport08_en.pdf 
98Transparency International, (2004), Transparency International Annual Report 2003, 
http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/ti_annual_report_2003?e=2496456/3168301 
Master’s Thesis   Isabell Johannesson 
2014  Marina Steendam 
	   27	  
5.4 The case of Kenya 
Kenya is a country that has been characterized by institutionally and political instability since the country 
gained its independence from Great Britain.99  The country has several times faced social and political 
challenges where the government has been perceived as complex and dominated by principles that 
provide a key feature for corruption among the countries’ political authorities and institutional sectors. 
Today Kenya is ranked 136 among the world’s 175 most corrupt countries and corruption still occurs in 
many of Kenya´s key sector and institutions. 100,101  
 
Kenya has faced regular violence related to political elections since the shift from one-party rule towards 
the implementation of multi-party politics in the beginning of 1991. One of the most perceived political 
processes was the flawed Presidential election violence in 2007. Both national and international observers 
suspected vote rigging in the election process, where Mwai Kibaki was declared as president in 2007, and 
public anger spread across the country. This caused a deepening of ethnic divisions and radical post-
election violence lasting into 2008 and more than a thousand people died and fled in fear.102,103 
 
These drawbacks have faced the country on and off and have led to an unstable annual growth for Kenya. 
When the post-election violence occurred the country faced a radical economic downturn where the 
production and transport were disordered, resulting in among other things an increase of the basic goods. 
Furthermore the tourism revenue decreased by 80 per cent compared to previous years and the GDP fell 
from 7.0 per cent to 1.5 per cent between 2007 and 2008.104,105 After this weakness the country finally 
turned the corner and increased growth from 1.5 per cent in 2008 to 4,6 per cent in the end of 2012. 
Compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries where the annual GDP in 2012 was 4.26, Kenya lies a 
little above the average. The same pattern can be observed in table 7 during the estimated period from 
2000, with an exception in 2007-2008.106 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99BBC News, Kenya Profile, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13682176 
100Anti-Corruption Resource Center: http://www.u4.no/publications/kenya-overview-of-corruption-and-anti%20corruption/downloadasset/3114 
101Transparency International, Global Corruption barometer (GCB) 2013: http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=kenya   
102The BBC World Service Trust, (2008), The Kenyan 2007 elections and their aftermath: 
the role of media and communication, http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/kenya_policy_briefing_08.pdf 
103UK AID from the Department for International Development, (2009), Elections in Kenya 2007, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67654/elections-ke-2007.pdf 
104Ibid.   
105The World Bank, Country and region specific forecasts and data, http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-
prospects/data?variable=NYGDPMKTPKDZ&region=SST 
106Ibid.   
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Table 7: Annual Growth for Kenya and Sub-Saharan Africa countries  
 
5.5 The extent of corruption in the Kenyan institutions   
Corruption is common in the Kenyan essential sectors, such as the police, judiciary as well as public 
administration and financial management. According to the Global Corruption Barometer 2013 the most 
corrupt authority was the police and 95 per cent of the Kenyan citizens felt that the police were corrupt or 
extremely corrupt. In addition, 68 per cent of the respondents’ felt that the parliament was corrupt or 
extremely corrupt as well as 53 per cent felt that the political parties were corrupt or extremely corrupt.107  
Table 8 ranks the sectors in Kenya on a scale of 1-5 where a score of 5 is extremely corrupt and 1 is not 
corrupt at all.108  
 
Table 8: Extent of Corruption in the Kenyan sectors 
 
Transparency International´s East African Bribery Index 2013 data also indicates that 36 per cent of the 
respondents paid a bribe to speed up the service. Furthermore, 26 per cent of the respondents were 
involved in a bribery situation in order to access different services while a small portion of the respondents 
reported that they paid a bribe because it was expected as well as to avoid paying full cost for the service. 
These numbers are presented in table 9. This implies that the lack of transparency of transactions may be 
the root of bribery in the public sector.109  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2013, http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=kenya 
108Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2011/2012, http://www.transparency.org/country#KEN_PublicOpinion 
109East African Bribery Index 2013, 
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Table 9: The aim of a bribe 
 
5.5.1 Police  
The sector concerning the countries’ and individuals’ security in terms of the police was the most corrupt 
institution in Kenya 2013.  According to the East African Bribery Index 2013 more than 70 per cent of the 
Kenyans reported that they had accessed services by paying bribes. This number is consistent with the 
Eastern African Bribery Index 2012 where 64 per cent of the respondents reported that they been asked for 
a bribe by the police force. More specially, most common is that the Kenyan traffic police demand a 
bribe.110 The East African Bribery Index of 2012 states that the frequency of bribery situations related to the 
police force as well as the amount paid as a bribe have decreased compared to previous years.111  
 
5.5.2 Judiciary 
The judicial system is also one of the most essential institutions affected by bribery. According to the 
transparency International’s GCB 2011, 43 per cent of Kenyans have been involved in a bribery situation 
when interacting with the judiciary.112  
 
Freedom House 2013 also indicates that the Kenyan courts have for a long time been characterized by lack 
of capacity because the sector is affected by ineffective case management, poor infrastructure as well as 
underfinanced. This has in turn led to ineffective proses characterized by corruption where most of the 
ministers and officials that have performed corrupt allegations have been reinstated and never convicted.113  
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110East African Bribery Index 2013, 
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111Business Anti-Corruption Portal, (2014), A Snapshot of Corruption in Ghana, Retrieved from http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/sub-
saharan-africa/ghana-version/snapshot.aspx 
112Martini, M., (2012), Kenya: overview of corruption and anti-corruption, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre 
113Freedom House, Kenya, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/kenya#.U3tVgTnwK9M 
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5.5.3 Public Administration and Financial Management  
As stated above one of the most common reasons to pay a bribe was in order to access services provided 
by the public sector. One of the reasons is that the Kenyan institutional administration level is low and is 
generally characterized by lack of transparency and inefficiency. Since the implementation of the new 
constitution in 2010 there has been some positive progress and according to the Global Integrity Scorecard 
Kenya moved from 56 of 100 in 2006 to 60 in 2011 in terms of government conflict of interest.114,115 
 
In the 2012 Open Budget Index, which is a measure of transparency, Kenya scored 49 of 100, which is 
higher, compared to the average score of 43 for all the 100 countries that were included in the survey. This 
indicates that some information regarding governmental and financial activity is published for the people.116 
Furthermore, financial records are missing and the decisions regarding the countries budget are not often 
published. One example strengthens the fact that corruption exists was when over one million dollars went 
missing in 2010 from the Kenyan budget in terms of the public school system. This in turn caused the US to 
cancel its aid for the Kenyan school system.117,118  
 
5.6 The anti-corruption efforts in Kenya  
During the last decade the work to fight corruption has become a project involving several international 
organizations. As the most corrupt countries in the world are located in Africa it is no coincidence that most 
of the projects and anti-corruption strategies target the African continent. Many of the countries, for 
example Kenya, also have national anti-corruption movements in terms of reforms and establishment of 
organizations, but still there is a lack of success when it comes to major gains from the efforts, as there are 
mainly implementation problems.119 
 
5.6.1 Legal framework  
As mentioned above all levels of governmental corruption still remain a serious problem and have 
characterized the Kenyan system in terms of authorities and sectors since the independence from Great 
Britain. In addition, many examples of corruption have been commonly exposed in the police sector, official 
bodies, nongovernmental organizations and judiciary as well as state efforts that have undermined the civil 
society activity.120  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114Global Integrity, The Global Integrity Raport: 2011, https://www.globalintegrity.org/global/report-2011/kenya/ 
115Global Integrity, The Global Integrity Raport: 2006, https://www.globalintegrity.org/global_year/2006/ 
116International Budget Partnership, Kenya: Country Info, http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/country-info/?country=ke 
117Voice of America, Missing Millions Put Kenya's Public Education System in Jeopardy, http://www.voanews.com/content/missing-millions-put-kenyas-public-
education-system-in-jeopardy-86355052/159795.html 
118Martini, M., (2012), Kenya: overview of corruption and anti-corruption, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre  
119Persson, A., Rothstein, B., and Teorell, J., (2010), The failure of Anti-Corruption Policies A Theoretical Mischaracterization of the Problem, QoG Working 
Paper Series 2010:19, SIDA, https://www.sida.se/PageFiles/39460/Failure%20Anti_Corruption%20policy%20(2).pdf, 
120Freedom House, Kenya, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/kenya#.U3tVgTnwK9M 
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In the early stage of President Kibaki’s presidential mandate he promoted an anti-corruption agenda to turn 
the country from bribery as well as economic crimes towards a country with a more democratic system.  
After Kibaki won the election in 2002 he reformed and implemented some new laws to reduce corruption 
and strengthen the Public Finance Management system as well as the legal framework. For example in 
2003, the Anti-corruption and Economic Crime Acts as well as Public Officer Ethics Act was passed. The 
first mentioned act does not cover the private sector but it includes rules for among other things corrupt 
situations such as foreign bribery, money laundering, conflict of interest as well as abuse of office and 
blackmailing. The Public Officer Ethics Act 2003 includes a code of regulations where for example certain 
political officers need to declare their financial assets and all civil servants have perform their duties 
efficiently and honestly and ensure that the services are provided correctly.121 The Public Procurement and 
Disposal of Assets Act was implemented in 2005 to control everything related to procurement with strict 
penalties when the rule is broken. According to the GCB 2012, regarding this act the country has scored 
quite well compared to other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.122  
 
The proceeds of Crime and Money Laundering Act was also adopted in 2009 due to mostly international 
pressure. The main point of this act was to criminalize money laundering and adopt a rule to identify, trace 
as well as confiscate the proceeds of crime.123,124  
 
The public organ Kenyan anti-corruption commission (KACC) that was implemented under the Anti-
corruption and Economic Crime Act 2003 was also improved during President Kibaki. The goal of the 
organization was to investigate economic crimes as well as corrupt conduct in both the public and private 
sector. For example, KACC demanded that both public servants needed to report the source of income. 
Furthermore, KACC published information about the danger of corruption and also provided support for 
private people as well as institutions that reported any form of economic crime.125  
 
Another hope of a democratic Kenya was observed as the old constitution was extended and the new 
constitution was implemented in 2012. The new constitution provides freedom of the press and speech as 
well as a series of legal and institutional instruments for major gains for the country in terms of reducing 
corruption as well as strengthening political rights and civil liberties. However, there are some cases from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney General, (2009), Laws of Kenya, 
http://publicofficialsfinancialdisclosure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-
files/Kenya_Public%20Officer%20Ethics%20Act_2003_revised%202009_EN.pdf 
122Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2011/2012, http://www.transparency.org/country#KEN_PublicOpinion 
123Anti-Corruption Resource Center: http://www.u4.no/publications/kenya-overview-of-corruption-and-anti%20corruption/downloadasset/3114 
124Mathini, A., and Muange, B., (2010), New Law to Comat Money Laundering in Kenya, ALN Insight, http://www.africalegalnetwork.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/New-Law-to-Combat-Money-Laundering-in-Kenya-Bernard-Muange-Anjarwalla-Khanna-ALN-Insight-April-2010.pdf 
125The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, http://www.icac.org.hk/newsl/issue24eng/button1.htm 
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2011 when the government and civil servants tried to restrict the rights in practice that are provided by the 
constitution. For example there were reports that security forces as well as officials threaten journalists or 
media for corruption.126  
 
The current president Uhuru Kenyatta and the vice-president William Ruto, elected in 2013, appeared 
before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in connection with the post-election violence in 2007. They 
were charged with crimes such as human rights abuse as well as organizing ethic clashes. This shows that 
the governmental work against corruption as well as improvement of the economic growth is 
struggling.127,128  
 
5.6.2 Institutional efforts and framework  
In addition to the legal framework there are also institutional efforts trying to fight corruption in Kenya. 
Several anti-corruption organizations are operating countrywide to decrease the extent of economic crime 
and corruption. One of the biggest organizations in Kenya is the Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission 
(EACC) that replaced the former Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) and was adopted in 2011. 
ESCC is a public organ that was also formed by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act but also established 
under the new constitution. Since 2012, Mr. Mumo Matemu has been the chairman for EACC.129,130 EACC 
has mostly the same assignments as KACC but also an expanded mandate where they have the right to 
study cases of corruption as well as economic crimes across the country through law enforcement. EACC 
also combats corruption by using preventive measures and education on the impact of corruption as well as 
promotion of ethics and anti-corruption strategies.131,132 However, it has no prosecutorial power and all 
cases are transferred to the Attorney General.133   
 
The Attorney General is a public organization that recommends and gives legal advice to the government 
as well as civil authorities and institutions. Within this framework the organization also has the overall 
responsibility for the legal system and has to make sure that it works effectively and that everyone both in 
private and public sectors are equally treated before the law. The current general is Githu Muigai and he 
was appointed in 2011 by the former president Kibaki.134  However as the pattern of failure pervades the 
Kenyan anti-corruption effort, so does the work of the Attorney General. He has several times been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126Freedom House, Kenya, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/kenya#.U3tdMjnwK9O 
127Doya, D., (2014), Kenyan President Struggles With Growth as He Faces ICCT Trial, Bloomberg News,  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-04/kenya-
president-struggles-with-growth-as-he-faces-violence-trial.html 
128Freedom House, Kenya, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/kenya#.UzGuZdxa_1o 
129Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, http://www.eacc.go.ke 
130Anti-Corruption Resource Centre: http://www.u4.no/publications/kenya-overview-of-corruption-and-anti%20corruption/downloadasset/3114 
131Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, About EACC: Commissioners, Retrieved from http://www.eacc.go.ke/default.asp?pageid=4 
132Anti-Corruption Resource Centre: http://www.u4.no/publications/kenya-overview-of-corruption-and-anti%20corruption/downloadasset/3114 
133 Freedom House, Kenya, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/kenya#.U3tVgTnwK9M 
134State Law Office, http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/government/attoneyG.htm 
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criticized due to the absence of success in convicting people, especially high positioned civil servants 
involved in some economic and corrupt crimes. According to Freedom House data from 2010, the former 
KACC as well as EACC transferred several cases of corruption but only a few of them have been 
prosecuted since 2003.135 
 
Furthermore, the government created the Commission on Administrative Justice (CAJ) also called the 
office of the Kenyan ombudsman under the Commission on Administrative Justice Act that was adopted 
2011.136  The commission is an organ where private and public institutions as well as individuals can report 
complaints regarding public officials. In addition, CAJ also has a mandate for investigating all forms of 
maladministration such as public service delivery, address allegations of corruption, abuse of civil servants, 
discrimination as well as unethical conduct.137  
 
5.6.3 The performance of the anti-corruption strategies  
In spite of the corruption scandals that came to light in the beginning of 2000, failure of anti-corruption 
strategies as well as the charges from ICC, the national governmental trust has to some degree been 
improved. According to GCB 2010, 48 per cent of the respondents said that corruption has decreased since 
2007 and 39 per cent said it increased. Furthermore GCB data shows that 70 per cent of the inhabitants felt 
that the governmental efforts against corruption were effective which can be compared to 2006 where only 
39 per cent felt that the effort was effective.138,139,140  
 
The anti-corruption efforts in terms of the legal framework made by Kenya are considered to be quite 
forceful and according to the country´s Global Integrity, Kenya scored 100 on a scale of 0 - 100 in 2011. 
Thus, Kenya still performs weakly when it comes to the activities against corruption related to the political 
framework and scored only 50 on a scale of 0 to 100.141   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135Anti-Corruption Resource Center: http://www.u4.no/publications/kenya-overview-of-corruption-and-anti%20corruption/downloadasset/3114 
136The Commission on Administrative Justice, http://www.ombudsman.go.ke  
137Anti-Corruption Resource Centre: http://www.u4.no/publications/kenya-overview-of-corruption-and-anti%20corruption/downloadasset/3114 
138Transparency International, Global Corruption barometer (GCB) 2013: http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=kenya   
139Anti-Corruption Resource Centre: http://www.u4.no/publications/kenya-overview-of-corruption-and-anti%20corruption/downloadasset/3114 
140Freedom House, Kenya, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/kenya#.U3tVgTnwK9M 
141Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2013, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results 
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6.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
 
This chapter contains the theoretical framework where some traditional economic approaches explaining 
the factors that influence individuals to participate in corrupt actions. Additionally, the technology base is 
related to these theories. 
 
 
6.1 Public choice theory 
One of the economic theories used to define and explain a country's political system is the traditional public 
choice theory. The theory considers a normative theoretical framework determining what form of politics 
and governments that should take place in a country.142 The decision-making situations made by the 
bureaucrats and public officials are generally characterized by a rent-seeking behaviour. This behaviour 
includes maximizing their own welfare potential and interdependent interests within the constitutional 
rules. 143  This performance is especially observed in the developing country where the absence of 
legislators in the political system is widespread and rather dominated by bribery as well as political 
violence, possibly defined as corruption.144, These rent-seeking behaviours corrupt the governmental 
processes because these rent-seekers will make decisions that is influenced by their own gain.145  
 
Rothstein and Uslaner further explain this theory. They state that these corrupt institutions and 
governments are often related to poverty, and characterize mostly the developing part of the world. The 
way the institutions are formed and ruled leads to the fact that social trust cannot easily be established 
within a country. Furthermore, a general process can be observed in these countries, where corrupt 
governments have less money to spend on the infrastructure as well as on the income to the public 
officials.  Most likely this will in turn lead to public employees spending more time on their own interests 
than on the society as well as demanding funds from the public purse.146,147  
 
As stated above a corrupt government is an ineffective authority, which leads to among other things higher 
transaction costs. These transaction costs occur as a part of the economic interaction when creating 
contracts. Institutions and authorities, which are characterized by corruption, often have officials that seek 
gains from transactions and will thereby incur higher costs for individuals who are participating in different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Mbaku, J., (2010) Rent-Seeking and Corruption, http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/borner/borner10.pdf 
143Ostrom. V, (1975), Public Choice Theory: A New Approach to Institutional Economics. American Journal of Agriculture Economics, Vol. 57, No. 5, Proceeding 
Issues 
144Mbaku, J., (2010) Rent-Seeking and Corruption, http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/borner/borner10.pdf 
145 Ibid. 
146Butler, E., (2012), Public Choice – A Primer, London; The Institute of Economic Affairs 
147 Rothstein, B. Uslaner, E.M, (2005), All for all. Equality, Corruption and Social Trust, World Politics, nr 58 
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contracts. Szymanski (2007) strengthens this theory and states that one of the major risks for corruption is 
the lack of transparency.148   
 
A new modern economic theory has further extended the public choice theory and related the rent-seeking 
behaviour to the worldwide technological success. The technological achievements have the possibility to 
reduce transaction costs and instead improve the accountability and transparency. As stated above the 
developing part of the world is more sensitive to a potential risk of corruption and economic crime, which 
makes it more necessary to make transactions and different public processes transparent.149   
 
6.2 Neo-institutional economics: Principal-agent theory  
In line with the public choice theory the neo-institutional economic theory states that corruption is a 
phenomenon of social structure and generally occurs by the decisions of individuals as well as the result of 
interest and information asymmetry.150 According to the neo-institutional economic theory, corruption is 
considered a principal-agent problem. This theory is often related to be the most significant as well as 
predominant model to explain the dynamics behind a governmental and inter-organizational procurement 
process related to corrupt actions.151  
 
Within this framework there are two types of actors, the first is an agent often represented by a bureaucrat 
or a civil servant and second, a principal that generally is a citizen. Furthermore, the model is based on two 
key assumptions. The first assumption is that there is a conflict between the principal and the agent, which 
is assumed to have a rent-seeking behaviour. The second assumption is built on asymmetric information 
between the two actors, where the agents have more information compared to the principals. This differs 
from a majority of models and theories in the field of economics, which assume fair information, and hence 
in this framework transaction costs would be less important since they would correspond to the information 
costs.152 From these assumptions it is easy to observe the problem arising from the principal perspective.  
 
This problem occurs when a principal delegates a commission to an agent. The agent may have or obtain 
information regarding the assignment that he/she is not willing to share for the principal, asymmetric 
information. In addition, another issue is to motivate the agent to perform in the best interest of the principal 
as the agent may have other goals defined as conflict of interest. In this situation principals are responsible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148Rothstein, B. (2003). Sociala fällor och tillitens problem. Stockholm: SNS förlag 
149Neupane, A., Soar, J. and Vaidya, K. (2014) Anti-corruption capabilities of public e-procurement technologies: principal-agent theory. In: Technology 
development and platform enhancements for successful global e-government design. United States; IGI Publishing (IGI Global), Hershey, PA. 
150Groenendijk, N., (1997), A principal-agent model of corruption, The Netherlands; Kluwer Academic Publishers, Crime, Law & Social Change 27: 207–229 
151Neupane, A., Soar, J. and Vaidya, K. (2014) Anti-corruption capabilities of public e-procurement technologies: principal-agent theory. In: Technology 
development and platform enhancements for successful global e-government design. United States; IGI Publishing (IGI Global), Hershey, PA. 
152Grossman. S. and Hart. O., (1983), An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, The Econometrica Society, Econometrica, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan., 1983), pp. 7-45 
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for the failure costs and prevention costs, whilst agents perform and hide their activities. The conclusion of 
the model in short is that corrupt situations arise where there is asymmetric information as well as when the 
agent discloses the interest of the principal and acts in a self-winning manner.153,154 
 
One example of the principal-agent problem can be observed in the relationship between tax collectors and 
the management of the Treasury. The tax collectors (agents) have more available information about the 
revenue potential of a country’s tax base compared to the Treasury (principal). By means of this 
asymmetric information bribery and economic crime opportunities are possible. By relating this problem to 
the technological innovations, the asymmetric information may decrease since fees and transaction costs 
will be clearer which will result in less bribery in the equilibrium. A natural effect when cash decreases in 
society should be a less complex payment system with fewer opportunities for corrupt activities.155  
 
6.3 Collective action problem  
The assumptions made by the principal-agent model are that only the agent is engaged in corrupt 
behaviour. However, if the principal also is corrupt, the framework for principle-agent will not be able to 
work as an analytical tool for corruption. Therefor, instead of viewing corruption as a principal-agent 
problem, it is rather suggested that corruption is more likely to be a collective action problem.  
 
According to this problem the success of anti-corruption reforms and rewards of corruption is dependent on 
the number of individuals that are likely to be corrupt in the society. More specifically, the theory does not 
assume that all actors are by definition corrupt; instead rationality is understood to be reciprocal, in other 
words the actors are dependent on how others choose to act. This leads to what is called a collective action 
problem.156  
 
In addition, depending on to what degree corruption is defined, the benefits of a normal behaviour related to 
corruption are expected to be higher than the costs, at least in the short term. This is because, when 
people act corruptly, everyone has a personal gain from choosing corrupt alternatives before non-corrupt 
ones. As a result, when corruption is the ordinary behaviour, no one is willing to take the role of 
implementing anti-corruption reforms such as controlling devices and regimes that promote punishment. In 
addition, the theory argues that these actions are not effective due to lack of actors who have motivation to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Ibid.  
154Persson, A., Rothstein, B., and Teorell, J., (2010), The failure of Anti-Corruption Policies A Theoretical Mischaracterization of the Problem, QoG Working 
Paper Series 2010:19, SIDA, https://www.sida.se/PageFiles/39460/Failure%20Anti_Corruption%20policy%20(2).pdf, 
155Persson, A., Rothstein, B., and Teorell, J., (2010), The failure of Anti-Corruption Policies A Theoretical Mischaracterization of the Problem, QoG Working 
Paper Series 2010:19, SIDA, https://www.sida.se/PageFiles/39460/Failure%20Anti_Corruption%20policy%20(2).pdf, 
156Ibid 
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enforce them. This remains valid even though perfect information is assumed and all individuals consider 
the society to be better off with less corruption. 157  
 
In a context where corruption is not seen as an exception but instead as a prevailing rule, the establishment 
of reforms for fighting corruption usually arises as a “second order” collective action problem. Within this 
form of collective action problem the anti-corruption efforts and controlling measurements will not be 
effective since no one will be willing to hold the corrupt actors accountable. In the end, because the 
principals are corrupt and are performing in a matter that is not in the interest of the society but rather 
prioritize their own interest, reforms against corruption established on the grounds of principal-agent will be 
unsuccessful. 158,159    
 
6.4 Game theory  
A fourth theory that is applied in this paper is game theory, which likewise is in line with previous presented 
decision theories and analyses decision-makers strategically independent behaviours. The aim of the game 
theory model is to study and explain the different interacting strategies of all actors participating in the 
game.160   
 
According to this approach there are two or more individuals participating in the game, called players. The 
players have strategies and depending on which combination of strategies that is chosen by the players, 
the outcome will differ. These strategies weigh the cost against the benefits. 161 There are two key 
assumptions that underlie this theory, the first is that the players act rationally. More specifically, the player 
is rational as he/she makes decisions according to his/hers preferences with the aim of maximizing his/her 
own welfare.162  The second assumption states that the decision-makers deliberate strategically and 
intelligently, where the player takes the choices of others into account when deciding.163 The theory studies 
different games but mutually they all face the characteristic of dependency between them. This means that 
the outcome of each agent is dependent on the strategies of all other agents.164  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 USAID, Uganda mobile money assessment and case study, 
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158 USAID, Uganda mobile money assessment and case study, 
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160 Ross, D., (2010), Game Theory, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/ 
161Li Lianju, S. and Luyan. P, (2011), Game Theory Analysis of the Bribery Behavior, International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 2 No. 8 
162Myerson, R., (1997), Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, First Harvard University Press 
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Game theory is used as both a microeconomic and macroeconomic model when studying quantitative 
example and can be applied in this case to bribery behaviour where the idea is to study the strategies of 
the person who accepts bribes and the person who refuse the bribe. The study assumes that all individuals 
foster their own interests in their own lives, corresponding to the above-mentioned basic assumption of 
rationality. Bribery will then be the consequence when all agents are playing according their optimal 
strategy after observing their own as well as other agents’ actions.165 This decision-making process can be 
explained through a simple static game model where the general bribery pattern consists of two players, 
player A and player B, where the aim is to exchange their interest. This model assumes complete 
information and three different outcomes presented in table 10. 
 
Case1 Bribery, Bribery: Player A is interested in some kind of benefit, which he/she can obtain from Player 
B by giving a bribe. This leads to the fact that player B gets additional revenue to his income which we 
denote by a but also an additional cost that is related to corrupt activities such as moral and risk which is 
denoted b. The same holds for player A where the additional revenue is denoted by d and the cost is 
denoted by e. 
 
Case 2, Bribery, No Bribery: If player B refuses to accept the bribe from player A, all sorts of benefits and 
costs will be eliminated and the outcome will be 0 for both participating agents.  
 
Case 3, No bribery, Bribery: Player A will choose to not participate in bribery while player B will choose to 
demand a bribe. This leads to a cost related to corrupt activities for player B that is denoted by c. Player A 
however will get a moral satisfaction and gain e.  
 
Case 4, No bribery, No Bribery: If either player A or player B chooses to participate in corrupt activities the 
outcome will be 0 for both. 
A/B Bribery No Bribery 
Bribery a-b, d-e -c,e 
No Bribery  0,0 0,0 
Table 10: Game Theory 	  
From the assumptions made above the players act in self-interest and choose the strategy that maximizes 
their own welfare by studying the other player’s decision. Therefore, in this case a,b,d,e> 0 and in order to 
find the Nash equilibrium one needs to determine each player’s strategy. Player A will always choose 
bribery despite the strategy chosen by player B since d-e>e and 0=0. Similar arguments hold for player B 	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where a-b>-c and 0=0. From this one can conclude that bribery is the dominant strategy for both player A 
and player B and the Nash equilibrium becomes the situation where player A chooses bribery and player B 
also chooses bribery.166  
 
7. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
 
This chapter contains a literature review, including a summary of other empirical evidence as well as other 
perspectives of the mobile banking that has been observed. 
 
The idea of establishing a new financial system in terms of mobile money became concrete when M-Pesa 
was launched 2007 in Kenya. The system has become a major part of the Kenyans’ lives and has provided 
an effective instrument for Kenyans’ to access banking services. Due to this mobile money development 
several countries worldwide have been trying to replicate and implement the same system. However, there 
has still not been a similar effect as in Kenya but there are some examples where the implementations 
have succeeded to some degree.167  
 
7.1 The relationship between mobile banking and corruption in other countries 
Afghanistan has a similar mobile banking system called M-Paisa, which was implemented in 2008 by a 
company named Roshan. M-Paisa has expanded countrywide but not to the same extent as M-Pesa in 
Kenya. In 2010 an article was published by the General Counsel and Head of Government affairs for 
Roshan named Samir Satchu that presented significant results showing that the mobile banking in 
Afghanistan can be a fundamental instrument for reducing corruption. The research, which is presented in 
the article, was conducted in the district of Jalrezz in Wardak Province and analysed the relationship 
between a policeman’s salary before and after the implementation of M-Paisa. The results were that when 
the policemen started to receive their salary through M-Paisa the salary range increased by almost 25 % 
and it was also the first time they knew how much they earned and also The main conclusions from this 
research were that a country can benefit from the mobile banking in many different ways and this practise 
can be an alternative solution that discloses the corruption issues as well as the lack of transparency and 
accountability.168,169  
 
Another study by Krolikowski, Fu and Hope (2013) examines mobile payment as a tool to facilitate public 
services as well as for decreasing corrupt-related activities. The study was conducted in Dar es Salaam, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166Lianju, S. and Luyan. P, (2011), Game Theory Analysis of the Bribery Behavior, International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 2 No. 8 
167 Maurer, B., Chipchase, J., and Lee, P., (2011), Mobile Money: Afghanistan, innovations / volume 6, number 2, 
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/INOV_a_00067 
168Satchu, S., (2009), Rebuilding a Shattered Nation: The Impact of Wireless Communication and Mobile Banking in Afghanistan, Proparco’s Magazine issue 4 
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Tanzania and investigated the methods used to pay bills for public water since the introduction of the 
mobile banking. They found that technological innovations such as M-Pesa could improve the public 
service delivery gradually because when use of cash decreased and mobile banking increased this created 
more transparency and therefor accountability and fewer opportunities for corrupt as well as bribery 
activities. In addition the authors also stated that the use of mobile payments could lead to an expansion of 
water provision because the mobile platform overcomes obstacles such as distributional losses and 
corruption related to cash payments.170  
 
These two studies have shown great success regarding mobile banking in terms of replacing cash, which in 
turn might to some extent reduce corruption. This has opened up a new filed for research. However, the 
subject is still relatively new and there is only some literature available about the relationship between 
mobile banking and corruption. The limitation of literature is also because the transformation of the financial 
structure has not succeeded in other countries as well as in Kenya due to more awareness as well as 
regulations of government and banks that have put up obstacles for the mobile phone companies.171 Thus, 
there is more literature available on different economical themes regarding the impact of mobile banking 
innovations that have been investigated. Most of the literature has analysed the impact of mobile banking 
systems on development in terms of the easy access to the mobile financial services for low-income 
people.172  
  
7.2 M-Pesa and development in terms of the geographic spectrum 
When the mobile revolution of M-Pesa reduced the barriers related to cash flows it gave the opportunity for 
the majority of Kenyans including the unbanked to access financial services. There is therefore a growing 
literature regarding this subject as the rapid adoption of M-Pesa and the phenomenal success have given 
the world a new technological tool for both the developed as well as the developing part of the world.173  
 
One of the first ethnographic studies published about the impact of M-Pesa on households was by the 
World Bank and published in Brief 2009. More specifically, the article investigated the impact of the mobile 
phone platform on the poor people who used M-Pesa in Kenya. They found that many of the obstacles 
regarding cash transfers such as the lack of infrastructure and security were eliminated and M-Pesa had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170Krolikowski, A., Fu, X., and Hope, R,. (2013), Wireless Water: Improving Urban Water Provision Through Mobile Finance Innovations, 
ttp://oxwater.co.uk/#/mobile-water-payments/4559323117 
171T.S., (2013), Why does Kenya lead the world in mobile money?, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-
explains-18 
172Suri, T,. and Jack, W., (2011), Mobile Money: The Economics of M-PESA, NBER Working paper series; Working Paper 16721, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16721 
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facilitated the transactions on all levels. This in turn led to the fact that even individuals in the rural area, 
where cash is difficult to access, gained from this revolution. In addition, the authors also found potential 
savings behaviour by the users of the M-Pesa program, which they stated could open up a whole new 
service for the mobile phone companies.174  
 
William and Tavneet (2011) presented household as well as a monetary based research that investigated 
the mobile banking potential economic impact in terms of financial services on the users of M-Pesa. The 
authors also found that M-Pesa is a money-transfer product with great potential to reach out to every 
Kenyan household with different characteristics within a larger geographic range than any other 
technological device has been able to do before. This in turn has facilitated the informal cash transfers 
among both the rich and the poor as well as between the banked and unbanked individuals. In addition, 
they also confirmed the hypothesis of the World Bank and found that M-Pesa has impact on savings and 
investments as well as risk spreading on household level.175 
 
Similar results have been found by Inter Media that presented a financial transaction diary in 2013 that 
covered the impacts of M-Pesa in Tanzania. M-Pesa is also working as an alternative financial system in 
Tanzania, but the extent of the money market is not in the same range as in Kenya. The findings of the 
survey were that the majority of the households were more engaged in different transactions by using M-
Pesa rather than using cash. The result was built on the respondents feeling that M-Pesa is a more 
effective and safer delivery method compared to other informal as well as formal alternatives. In addition, 
they found that M-Pesa users were twice as likely to save money by using the mobile program related to 
non-users.176   
 
Another study presented by Rotberg and Aker (2013) also stated that the mobile technology could reach a 
broader range of individuals and in turn change their economic, political as well as social environment. 
They found that mobile phones can uplift weak and failed states due to the reducing communication costs 
which facilities the access to information. This in turn decreases the extent of asymmetric information 
between actors and reduces opportunities for bribery and economic crime. They also stated that a majority 
of the people in Africa have mobile phones while only a small proportion of the individuals have a bank 
account. In addition, they mention M-Pesa as an example of a helping tool for the poor due to the range of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174Morawczynski, O., and Pickens, M., (2009), Poor People Using Mobile Financial Services: Observations on Custumer Usage and Impact from M-PESA, CGAP 
Publication, 2014-04-08,https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9492/503060BRI0Box31MPESA1Brief01PUBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1   
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http://www.nber.org/papers/w16721 
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users. They stated that M-Pesa reduces the transaction costs related to transporting money since the 
spatial and temporal money barriers are eliminated. Furthermore, M-Pesa also helped the users to have 
control over their finances. Finally, the authors stated that as long as the trust factor exists for the mobile 
financial system, M-Pesa has great potential to create a more safe and secure society where everyone can 
access mobile money.177,178 
 
8. FIELD METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The field methodology is presented in this chapter in terms of the process of gathering data, along with the 
characteristics of the respondents as well as the limitations of the research. 
 
 
8.1 The initial stage and preparations   
In the initial stage we interviewed representatives from companies operating in Kenya, for example 
Fundamo. They provided valuable experience regarding mobile banking in Kenya and also made us fully 
aware of the scale of sensitivity in our subject regarding corruption. Because of this information we did not 
us e the word corruption while in Kenya. Instead we used other definitions for instance credibility and social 
trust.  
 
We also made a questionnaire because we wanted to investigate the relationship between M-Pesa and 
corruption through a qualitative method. By using a questionnaire we wanted to examine how the citizens 
experience the situation of corruption and also their usage, frequency and habits of mobile banking. By 
using a qualitative method, corruption sensitivity is less likely to occur compared to quantitative analyses 
due to the objectification it poses.  
 
8.2 Reviewing of the questionnaire  
The questionnaire used in order to collect valuable information with the aim of developing a model, which is 
linked to the adoption of M-Pesa and to its impact on corruption based on both individual as well as society 
related questions. The questions are to some extent based on questions for measuring corruption in Kenya 
conducted by Afrobarometer as well as Transparency International. As the emphasis of this paper is on 
mobile banking and corruption the majority of the questions concern these factors.  
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The questionnaire is divided into six different themes. The first theme consists of socio-economic questions 
to collect the characteristics of the sample. Questions such as gender, age, and level of income as well as 
education are identified. This is followed by the next set of questions that regards the mobile banking in 
Kenya. There are questions about how the respondents use M-Pesa including how frequently one uses it 
as well as when one started to use the mobile banking. The concluding questions deal with corruption in 
the society as well as one’s involvement in corrupt activities. The questions under this theme regard social 
trust, loyalty as well as expectations.   
 
The answers are formed in a standardized way in order to make it simpler to collect data as well as 
generate good alternatives for qualitative opinions. More specifically, the questionnaire consists of multiple 
choice questions as well as dichotomous questions where the respondents only have two alternatives. In 
addition there are also answers consisting of numbers such as for age in order to define subsets of cases. 
The same questions were answered by all respondents except the questions under theme three related to 
working force, which were only answered by respondents working in the public sector. The questionnaire 
can be found in Appendix C.  
 
8.3 Details of respondents  
The areas selected for our study were located in different parts of Nairobi and were chosen randomly. The 
reason for choosing different areas across Nairobi was to capture a variation between respondents in terms 
of demographic as well as socio-economic factors. More specifically we handed out questionnaires in the 
provincial towns of Kilimani, Kibera, Westland, Gigiri, Kasarani, Maziwa and its surrounding villages as well 
as in the City Centre of Nairobi. The division of questionnaires and the sample’s geographic distribution 
were 22 per cent in the City Centre, 5 per cent in Gigiri, 22 per cent in Kasarani, 8 per cent in Kibera, 13 
per cent in Killimani, 9 per cent in Maziwa and 21 per cent in Westland as presented in table 11 and shown 
in figure 4.   
Table 11: Location of respondents                                      Figure 4: Location of respondents  
City Center  
22% 
Gigiri 
4% 
Kasarani 
22% 
Kibera 
8% 
Killimani 
13% 
Maziwa 
9% 
Westland 
22% 
Location of respondents 
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In order to investigate the possible relationship between M-Pesa and corruption, the sample of respondents 
consists of a variety of individuals using the services. In addition the sample was selected at random. To 
gather our sample, we visited crowded places and mainly areas where shopping malls were established 
due to a variation of people in these places.  
 
8.4 Limitations of our research 
The qualitative method is believed to be suitable in order to investigate the relationship between M-Pesa 
and corruption. However there are some limitations when using questionnaires and also limitations that we 
have faced related to our topic, which we need to be aware of when analysing and drawing conclusions 
from the data collected.  
 
The most important, and perhaps most challenging limitation in our case, is to what degree our selected 
respondents have been honest when answering the questions. As mentioned above, some of our questions 
are of a more sensitive kind, which may cause some respondents to consider it safer to answer dishonestly 
the questions regarding loyalty and social trust. One way to prevent this from having impact on our result 
was to clearly state in the questionnaire that all information is confidential. We have also been clear with all 
respondents that if there are any questions they consider to be inappropriate they do not have to fill in any 
of the alternatives. In those few cases we have not been able to use any information filled by the 
respondents, but on the other hand by giving this instruction to the respondents we have also made sure 
that all sensitive questions are answered with honesty.  
 
One limitation when using questionnaires is that the questions can also be understood differently based on 
individuals’ preferences. In addition, the questions can be general and broadly defined which could lead to 
different interpretations that are not covered by the questions and answers. In order to avoid respondents’ 
confusion we have always been present in order to be able to answer questions that arise when a 
respondent read through the questionnaire.179  
  
Another limitation of our study is the fact that M-Pesa is relatively new and hence it might not have had 
impact on the society as of yet. In some aspects it truly has but in terms of corruption it might take a longer 
time to show any impact. Another consequence of M-Pesa’s recent introduction is that there is limited 
access to research within the area. We however find the quality of existing research to be of good quality 
and hence we have had good access to basic material.  	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In addition, the sample consists of 204 observations, which is rather small and is only conducted in limited 
areas across the big city of Nairobi. The law of large number states that the probability of obtaining a 
sample mean, which is close to the population mean, increases when the results are built on a large 
enough sample. Therefore, the size of the data might not be a correct representative sample for all 
individuals in Kenya. However according to Scheyvens and Storey (2003) the sample is large enough for 
reliable estimations.180   
 
Finally, the questions were conducted in English and some of the respondents did not have sufficient 
language skills in order to answer the questions. In addition we also faced a limitation where the language 
differences between the English spoken in Kenya and the English we speak. To avoid this having any 
impact on our study we have, as mentioned above with other limitations, always made sure to be present 
and explain if any questions arose. We do not consider that the language differences have had any impact 
on our result. 
 
9. OVERVIEW OF DATA 
 
 
This chapter contains a summary of the data collected. We will present the data and the variables as well 
as how we will use them to analyse a possible relationship between M-Pesa and Corruption. 
 
 
9.1 Structure of data  
To evaluate the effect of M-Pesa on corruption, the regressions performed are based on individual level 
data. We have used a cross-sectional methodology where different specifications are estimated to observe 
a possible relationship between M-Pesa and corruption. In the analysis categorical measures where socio-
economic variables such as gender, income and age are included as well as continuous factors that handle 
the individual use of M-Pesa and the extent of corruption in Kenya. The information collected regarding M-
Pesa and corruption was the used to construct three new variables. These are reported and explained 
further down.  
 
The data analysed in this paper includes 204 individuals and 73 different variables. This individual based 
framework for considering the determinants of M-Pesa and corruption provides some guidance on suitable 
variables to include in the empirical models. A summery of the data is presented in table 1 in Appendix A.  
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In addition, table 2 in Appendix A displays the main features of the entire raw data in terms of the 
information that has been collected. The variables used in order to investigate the relationship between M-
Pesa and corruptions are described. Specifically, this table shows the overall performance of the 
respondents as well as the distribution of the variables.  
 
9.2 Measuring corruption  
Even though corruption is one of the most common problems in the developing part of the world it is still 
extremely difficult to quantify the phenomenon with exactness due to its shadowy and secretive nature. 
However, there are some general measurements to estimate the extent of corruption in countries. One of 
the most used measurements with high reliability in international policy is the corruption perception index 
(CPI) presented by Transparency International.181 The index for 2013 covered 177 countries with data 
where the extent of corruption in each country´s public sector is scored from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very 
clean). Important to notice is that no country scores 0 and almost 60 per cent score less than 50, which 
indicates a serious problem of corruption among the world’s countries.182 The CPI influences our corruption 
measurement instruments. The index is built on perceptions where the respondents answer questions 
divided into three themes. The first theme, which is most essential for our study, concerns the spread of 
different kinds of corruption such as grants and bribes. The following section concerns the extent of 
corruption in the public sector in terms of contribution to health and education. The third theme regards the 
individuals’ views when it comes to the governmental anti-corruption movements.183   
 
Transparency International also provides a worldwide opinion survey regarding corruption named The 
Global Corruption Barometer (GCB).184 The barometer is built on interviews conducted around the world 
with the aim of charting individuals’ general experience of corrupt action as well as their thoughts about 
public and governmental corruption. The measurement also shows how willing a person is to participate in 
anti-corruption research.185 The barometer states that since 2010 the number of people willing to participate 
in anti-corruption efforts has decreased. In 2010 77 per cent were willing to report a corrupt activity 
whereas the corresponding number in 2013 was 69 per cent. This strengthens our thoughts about 
observing corruption as a collective action problem where the phenomenon is so common that it is hard to 
make a change. The biggest problem is the lack of confidence in the existing laws and enforcement. Many 
of the respondents also reported that they were afraid of reprisals due to the fact that there does not exist 	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any effective or safe mechanism that empowers and facilitates the reporting of an inconvenient situation.186 
 
9.3 Dependent variables  
Three new variables are generated, where two of them refer to our dependent variables. These variables 
are the extent of corruption in society and individual participation in corrupt activities as well as M-Pesa. 
These variables are proxies of corruption. The reason for using two different measures for corruption is that 
it hopefully will present a more correct picture of the extent of corruption in Kenya since both the 
respondents’ individual perspective of how widespread corruption is in the society as well as how many 
participate in corrupt activities are estimated. 
 
9.3.1 The extent of corruption in society  
The first variable relates to overall corruption where the extent of corruption in the society is measured. The 
variable includes the questions under theme 4 in the questionnaire regarding social trust as well as the 
question under theme 6, which handles expectations in the society. Depending on the respondent’s 
thoughts of the extent of corruption in Kenya each respondent gets an average number. More specifically, 
the multiple-choice questions are graded on a scale where a high number corresponds to corruption in 
Kenya and a low number states that no corruption exists. The lowest number possible is 6 and the highest 
possible is 28. The average number for the whole sample is 19.84.  
 
In order to control for the linear relationship among the variables the correlation is presented in table 12. 
Despite the fact that certain variables have low correlation they are all significantly different from zero at a 5 
per cent confidence level that indicates that we can conclude a positive correlation.   
  Trusted Gain1 Gain2 Dishonest Give bribe Demand bribe 
Trusted 1           
Gain1 0.14** 1         
Gain 2 0.19*** 0.63*** 1       
Dishonest 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 1     
Give bribe 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.50*** 0.40*** 1   
Demand bribe 0.26*** 0.31*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.66*** 1 
Table 12: Correlation between variables included in corruption society. Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level.  
 
9.3.2 Individual participation in corrupt activities 
The second dependent variable generated is a corruption measurement related to the respondents’ 
individual participation in corrupt situations. The variable is built on theme 5, loyalty, that is related to 
individual corrupt activities such as if the respondents demand or will accept an offered bribe. Similar to the 	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measurement related to the extent of corruption in the society, the answers are graded on a scale where a 
high number corresponds to participation in corrupt situations and a low number corresponds to a non-
corruption approach. The lowest number possible is 3 and the highest number is 12. The average number 
for the whole sample is 5.01. Also for this measurement the linear relationship is controlled and the 
correlation between the variables is presented in table 13. The correlation coefficients are significantly 
different from zero and indicate a strong positive relationship.  
 Variable  Offered Accept Demand 
Offered 1     
Accept 0.65*** 1   
Demand  0.40*** 0.62*** 1 
Table 13: Correlation between variables included in corruption individual. Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. 
 
9.3.3 Cronbach’s Alpha  
Internal consistency in terms of reliability and validity are two important basics when evaluating a 
measurement, especially for an instrument generated from field questionnaires. Reliability indicates the 
ability of the variable to estimate consistently and is related to the validity. In order to control for these 
elements one needs to test the dimensional distribution of the variable in terms of whether rightly or 
wrongly discarded. This test is called the Cronbach’s Alpha test and takes the values between 0 and 1. If 
there exist any problem related to the ordinal scale in the measurement the test will give a low Alpha, which 
normally can be classified as a number lower than 0.5, hence showing that measurement is not reliable. In 
order to accept the reliability of the variable the value of Alpha needs to exceed 0.70 but should not be 
above 0.90 because if it is to high the variables might be unnecessary.187  
 
First, a Cronbach’s Alpha test is performed for the measurement related to the extent of corruption in the 
society. We expect to find a high value of Alpha due to the positive correlation between the variables. The 
Alpha for a corrupt society is 0.78, which indicates high reliability and therefore acceptable and can be 
observed in table 14.  
Item Obs Item-test correlation Item-rest correlation 
Average inter-item 
covariance Alpha 
Trusted 204 0.54 0.33 0.43 0.80 
Gain1 204 0.69 0.51 0.37 0.75 
Gain2 204 0.76 0.61 0.33 0.73 
Dishonest 204 0.66 0.50 0.40 0.76 
Give Bribe 204 0.78 0.67 0.35 0.72 
Demand Bribe 204 0.74 0.59 0.35 0.73 
Test Scale       0.37 0.78 
Table 14: Cronbach’s Alpha for corruption society  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187Tavakol, M. and Dennick, R., (2011), Making sense of Cronbach’s alpha, International Journal of Medical Education. 2011; 2:53-55 
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Second, in the same way a Cronbach’s Alpha test is performed for the measurement instrument indicating 
the individual participation in corrupt activities. The Alpha value for this index is 0.79, which indicates that 
the measurement has high validity and accuracy and is accepted in this study.  This can be displayed in 
table 15.  
Item Obs Item-test correlation Item-rest correlation 
Average inter-item 
covariance Alpha 
Offered 204 0.82 0.60 0.44 0.76 
Accept 204 0.91 0.76 0.25 0.57 
Demand 204 0.78 0.57 0.51 0.79  
Test Scale       0.40 0.79 
Table 15: Cronbach’s Alpha for corruption individual   
9.3.4 Biases and problem  
It is important to notice that the two generated varibles for corruption may not be free from biases and 
problems. Generating measurment instruments based on field questionnaries has a high probability of 
underestimating the subject of interest. More specifically, the measurment is built on questions which are 
self-reported by people living in Nairobi. Some of the respondents who may been involved in corrupt 
situations in the past or currently may tend to excuse their behavior or may be afraid of telling the truth. If 
this is the case their answers are not reliable and the two measurement instruments may be distorted.188  
 
9.4 Independent variables  
The data set consists of 71 different independent variables related to both socio-economic factors of the 
respondents as well as factors defining the relationship between corruption and M-Pesa. The independent 
variables are divided into three groups depending on their different characteristics, binary, nominal as well 
as ordinary. The variables are ranged on an interval scale level, where each variable for every category has 
a number. However some categories will be biased when converting them to measurable scales since the 
variables will have different scale effects. More specifically, the distance between 1 and 2 may not be the 
same distance as between 3 and 4 for the same category. In order to correct for this we have generated 
dummy variables sorted by their feature. These variables only have two possible values, 1 and 0 where 
value 1 indicates the feature of the variables that is of interest for this study and 0 otherwise. From this the 
variables can be ranged on an interval scale when estimating.  
Binary Variables Nominal Variables Ordinary Variables  
Gender Age Social Trust 
Mobile Phone Age squared  Position of Power 
M-Pesa Young Dishonesty 
Use of Mobile Banking Middle Give Bribe 
ISCO variables Older Demand bribe Public 
Other occupation Education Offered Bribe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188Torgler, B. and Valev, N., (2004), Corruption and age, Crema Working Paper No. 2004 – 24, http://ww.crema-research.ch/papers/2004-24.pdf 
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ISCED variables Income Accept Bribe 
Other education Income 1-4  Demand Bribe Private 
No education  Occupation Corruption society 
Measurement of M-Pesa Frequency of using M-Pesa Corruption individual  
  Transaction 1 and transaction 2   
Table 16; Binary, nominal and ordinary variables 
 
9.4.1 Binary variables  
The first group of independent binary variables consist of variables defining gender, mobile phone use, 
ISCO	   and ISCED189 classifications as well as variables for M-Pesa. In addition, one binary variable is 
generated, in terms of measurement instruments for M-Pesa.  
 
9.4.2 M-Pesa 
This index represents the respondents’ use of M-Pesa, which corresponds to the questions in theme 4 in 
our questionnaire. The index is based on the questions related to frequency of use, which year the 
respondents started to use the mobile service, which functions the individuals’ use and also what amount 
the individual transferred in the last two transactions. The variable takes the values between 4 and 22. As 
can be seen below in table 17 some of the variables’ correlation is fairly low but they are still significant as 
at least a 10 per cent confidence level exists, and hence we can use the measurement. Only one of the 
correlation measurements is non-significant at all significance levels. 
  Purpose Usage Start Transaction1 Transaction2 
Purpose 1         
Usage 0.31*** 1       
Start 0.12* 0.12* 1     
Transaction1 0.26*** 0.14** 0.20*** 1   
Transaction2 0.26*** 0.18*** 0.08 0.62*** 1 
Table 17: Correlation between variables included in Mpesasoc Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. 
 
In order to control for internal consistency a Cronbach´s Alpha test is performed for the M-Pesa variable in 
the same way as for the measurement instruments related to corruption. The estimated Alpha parameter 
takes the value of 0.58, which is quite low and indicates that the measurement might underestimate the 
mean of M-Pesa among the respondents. The low value might be due to the measurement instrument 
being heterogeneously generated in terms of too few questions included or poor interrelatedness between 
the variables. Additionally, this underestimation can be strengthened by the low correlation between the 
variables, as presented above. However, according to George and Mallory (2003), values close to 0.60 are 
good.190,191 We therefor consider the value high enough in this case to use for this study’s estimations.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Note: ISCO is explained under the section for nominal and ordinal variables 
190Cortina, J., (1993), What Is Coefficient Alpha? An Examination of Theory and Applications, Journal of Applied Psychology 1993, Vol. 78, No.1, 98-104 
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Item Obs Sign Item-test correlation Item-rest correlation 
Average inter-item 
covariance Alpha 
Purpose 204   0.66 0.33 0.69 0.54 
Usage 204   0.42 0.29 1.04 0.57 
Start 204   0.50 0.18 0.96 0.61 
Transaction1 204   0.75 0.51 0.49 0.41 
Transaction2 204   0.70 0.47 0.59 0.45 
Test Scale         0.75 0.58 
Table 18: Cronbach’s Alpha for M-Pesa  
9.4.3 Gender 
The second independent variable used in this study is gender, which is included in the regressions as a 
dummy. This variable indicates the demographic characteristics for the sample in terms of if the respondent 
is a male or a female. The data set consists of 91 women and 113 men, which corresponds to 45 per cent 
women and 55 per cent men.  
 
According to some research, gender is expected to have a different impact on corruption, and they state 
that women are less corrupt than men. Other evidence has also been found, showing that there is a 
connection between higher presence of women in governmental sectors and less corruption. In addition, a 
study by the World Bank strengthens this relationship and concludes that men are less trustworthy than 
women and are more prone to corruption.192 This economic theory is consistent with our data sample 
where men have a higher average value for both the view of the extent of the corruption in the society as 
well as individual participation in corrupt activities.  
  Individual participation in corruption The view of corruption in society 
Male 5.33 19.96 
Female 4.63 19.69 
Table 19: Average measurement for corruption in sample (gender) 
The adoption and development of technology and research is also related to gender. More specially, 
different reports state that there is a gender gap in adoption of new technology in that men adopt 
technology innovation earlier compared to women. One example is the launch of the first smart phone 
where the majority of the users in the initial stage were men. In addition, for the case of M-Pesa there is 
also a difference in usage between men and women; the statistics state that men use M-Pesa 35 per cent 
more frequently compared to women.193,194 However, this theory cannot be observed in our data set. 
Instead it shows the opposite pattern where the women among the respondents start using M-Pesa earlier 
as well as use it more frequently compared to the men represented in the sample.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191Glien, J. and Glien, R., (2003), Calculating, Interpreting, and Reporting Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Coefficient for Likert-Type Scales, Midwest Research to 
Practice Conference in Adult, Continuing, and Community Education   
192Nawaz, F., Gender and Corruption, http://corruptionresearchnetwork.org/resources/frontpage-articles/gender-and-corruption 
193Digital, Z., (2011), Why are women slower to adopt technology?, The IT Donut, http://www.itdonut.co.uk/blog/2011/10/why-are-women-slower-adopt-
technology 
194. Mbiti, I. and Weil, D., (2011), Mobile Banking: The impact of M-Pesa in Kenya, National Bureau Of Economic Research Working Paper 17129, 
http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/David_Weil/Mbiti%20Weil%20NBER%20working%20paper%2017129.pdf 
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  Started using M-Pesa Frequency of use 
Male 6.11 2.92 
Female 5.75 2.84 
Table 20: Average measurement for M-Pesa in sample (gender) 
9.5 Nominal and ordinal variables  
The nominal variables in the model include the demographic characteristics such as age, education as well 
as an economic variable, income. In addition nominal and ordinal variables include active variables such as 
the respondents’ occupation, the private as well as public trust in the society and frequency of using M-
Pesa.  
 
9.5.1 Age 
A study by Torgler, B. and Valev, N. (2004) states that age has an impact on corruption. More specifically, 
the result indicates that the higher the age the greater impact of the justifiability of corruption compared to 
people in lower age.195 However, in this study the economic pattern cannot be observed; instead the 
younger respondents are more prone to corruption compared to older when it comes to individual 
participation in corrupt activities. For the view of corruption in the society the average measurement 
instrument varies between the ages and the highest level can be observed for respondents over 57 years 
old, which to some extent is consistent with the theory.  
  Individual participation in corruption The view of corruption in society 
18-25 5.40 20.10 
26-33 4.99 19.52 
34-41 4.81 19.66 
42-48 3.55 20.27 
49-56 3.67 19.00 
57-  4.50 24.00 
Table 21: Average measurement for corruption in sample (age) 
On the same basis, some papers show that there exists a generation gap when it comes to technology 
adoption. More specifically, the younger people seem to adopt technology faster than older people and the 
gap is even thought to increase with time.196  Regarding the statistical feature in our data set regarding age 
and corruption, one can observe the same pattern of the generation gap as stated in the theory. More 
specifically, according to our sample, young respondents started to use M-Pesa earlier and used the 
financial mobile banking, M-Pesa, more often compared to the older respondents. 
  Started using M-Pesa Frequency of use 
18-25 5.23 2.79 
26-33 6.33 2.97 
34-41 6.38 2.91 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195Torgler, B. and Valev, N., (2004), Corruption and age, Crema Working Paper No. 2004 – 24, http://ww.crema-research.ch/papers/2004-24.pdf 
196 Koschei, J., (2013), Blog post: The Growing Technological Generation Gap, The Industry, http://theindustry.cc/2013/02/12/the-growing-technological-
generation-gap/ 
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42-48 6.09 3.00 
49-56 8.00 3.33 
57-  8.00 1.50 
Table 22: Average measurement for M-Pesa in sample (age) 
9.5.2 Education  
Education is also included in the model as an independent variable since certain reports state that 
education may be seen as one of the most effective mechanisms against corruption. The relationship 
between education and corruption is based on the fact that education is seen as a factor that strengthens 
an individual’s integrity and also, most important, shapes the community in terms of rule of law and 
democratic authorities.197 In addition, one study, which was conducted in six different countries located in 
Latin America, found that students with higher education are less tolerant of corrupt activities. Another 
study also found that people with education are less likely to participate in activities, which violate the 
law.198 However, this pattern cannot be observed in our data where both measurement instruments for 
corruption increase on average between the education levels indicating that the tolerance for corruption 
decreases when the respondents are older.  
  Individual participation in corruption The view of corruption in society 
No education 4.00 18.50 
Primary 4.75 19.25 
Secondary 5.55 20.24 
Tertiary 5.08 20.16 
Post-Graduate 4.66 19.13 
Other 5.10 21.20 
Table 32: Average measurement for corruption in sample (education) 
An individual’s education level also has significance when it comes to how fast technology is adopted. One 
study has investigated and followed the adoption of computers during 1970 and 1990 in OECD countries. 
The study found that educational level is an important determinant of the level of investment in computers. 
The positive connection strengthens the argument that a high level of education results in a high level of 
skills and also that more investments result in a more advanced capital goods sector.199 Another study 
concerning technology in general rather than specific computers concludes that education is significant 
both in order to simplify the purchase and also when handling new information which could be seen as 
evidence that individuals with higher education adopt new technology faster.200 The relationship between 
education and technology stated by the theory can only partly be identified among our respondents. Both 
the technology in terms of when the respondents started using M-Pesa as well as the frequency of using 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197Transparency International, Education, http://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/education 
198Inter-American Development Bank, Education as a tool against corruption, http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/transparency/support-for-countries/education-as-a-
tool-against-corruption,6752.html 
199 Hall, B. And Khan, B., (2002), Adoption of New Technology, http://eml.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/HallKhan03%20diffusion.pdf 
200 . Foster, A. and Rosenzweig, M., (2010), Microeconomics of technology adoption, Center Discussion Papers Yale University, 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp984.pdf 
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the mobile program vary between the education levels where the highest value for both variables can be 
observed for respondents with primary education.  
  Started using M-Pesa Frequency of use 
No education 5.50 3.50 
Primary 7.00 3.25 
Secondary 6.12 2.62 
Tertiary 5.70 2.88 
Post-Graduate 6.13 3.03 
Other 5.60 2.80 
Table 24: Average measurement for M-Pesa in sample (education) 
The education system, structure and its content vary across the world’s countries and the choices of 
education have increased rapidly. Therefore the United Nation’s organization for education, science and 
culture (UNESCO) has implemented a universal system for education classification named International 
Standard Classification of Education, ISCED. More specifically, the aim of classifying educational 
programmes is to simplify when constructing statistics regarding education, both from a country perspective 
and also internationally. The classification is based on a multi-dimensional classification framework and 
consists of a seven-level hierarchical system where all included education levels are divided and 
administered with a code number from 0 to 6.201,202 
Code Level of education 
0 Pre-primary 
1 Primary education or first stage of basic education 
2 Lower secondary education or second stage of basic education 
3 Upper secondary education 
4 Post-secondary education non-tertiary education 
5 First stage of tertiary education 
6 Second stage of tertiary education 
Table 25: ISCED classification 
9.5.3 Income  
The income variable in our data set provides information of the respondent’s monthly income. There are 
reports stating a positive and significant relationship between income and corruption in terms of a 
distributive conflict over corruption. More specifically, statistics show that the extent of corruption is more 
limited among lower income individuals due to limited money when participating in possible corrupt 
situations. This relationship can also be shown by the public choice theory where the high-income 
population have greater possibility to behave corruptly in terms of rent seeking due to the cost of diverting 
public resources to private gain and hence benefit from corrupt activities.203,204 From this study’s data one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, (2006), International Standard Classification of Education ISCED 1997, 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/isced97-en.pdf 
202United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education, 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-standard-classification-of-education.aspx 
203Castillo, A. and Cousinou, G., (2011), Distributive Effects and Justification of Corruption, 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDIQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aecpa.es%2Fuploads%2Ffiles%2Fmodules
%2Fcongress%2F10%2Fpapers%2F510.doc&ei=FL9OU9aPPIeW0QXNzoDYBg&usg=AFQjCNGAlHIu55zihIcTZuEu_09XhMdLzw 
204Mbaku, J., (2010) Rent-Seeking and Corruption, http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/borner/borner10.pdf 
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can to some extent observe this economic pattern among the income levels where respondents who have 
a higher monthly income are more prone to corruption. In addition, it can also be observed that 
respondents with a higher income state that corruption is a widespread phenomenon whereas the low-
income respondents report the opposite. However this can be due to the lower income respondents not 
having the possibility to participate, which makes the corrupt situations invisible for these people.    
  Individual participation in corruption The view of corruption in society 
0-3000 5.13 20.90 
3001-6000 6.27 19.64 
6001-9000 5.27 21.47 
9001-12000 5.53 21.06 
12001-15000 5.78 19.52 
15001-18000 4.65 19.82 
18001- 4.43 18.84 
Table 26: Average measurement for corruption in sample (income) 
When it comes to the relationship between income and technology it is proven that high income is profitable 
when adopting new technology. This is also a reason why poor countries have complications in catching up 
with technology and that households face limitations in terms of social status.205 However, on a country-
level one can easily conclude that Kenya is an exception due to its leading role in financial mobile banking. 
Hence, from our sample it seems that this theory cannot be applied on an individual-level either where low 
income people started using M-Pesa earlier or are more frequent users.  More specifically, the higher the 
income the later the respondents started using M-Pesa. Also, low-income respondents use it more 
frequently compared to high-income respondents, and thus the difference is small and not stable as it 
varies among the income levels.  
  Started using M-Pesa Frequency of use 
0-3000 5.40 2.85 
3001-6000 5.00 2.82 
6001-9000 4.33 3.07 
9001-12000 5.59 2.65 
12001-15000 6.78 2.93 
15001-18000 6.29 2.94 
18001- 6.40 2.91 
Table 26: Average measurement for M-Pesa in sample (income) 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205Foster, A. and Rosenzweig, M., (2010), Microeconomics of technology adoption, Center Discussion Papers Yale University, 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp984.pdf 
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9.5.4 Public and Private occupations   
The active variable in terms of occupation is important in the role of our model because it not only 
distinguishes between different types of occupation but also between respondents working in the private or 
public sector. Transparency International stated in 2013 that 
corruption is a large problem in the public sector of the world’s 
countries. Figure 5 covers 177 countries that have been ranked 
according to CPI. The colours indicate the level of perceived 
corruption where the darker colour indicates a higher level of 
corruption and the lighter colour little or no corruption. From this 
map one can sate that corruption is a widespread phenomenon in SSA. In the developing part of the world, 
corrupt politicians and government officials receive bribes believed to total between twenty and forty billion 
US dollars every year.206 This corresponds to 20-40 per cent of official development aid.207  
Private corruption does not exist to the same extent as public and government corruption. However it is still 
a worldwide problem and according to Transparency International more than 283 private international 
cartels were disclosed in a 15 years period. There is evidence that they have harmed the consumers in 
terms of direct economic losses to a value of 300 billion US dollars.208 In addition, the total cost of 
corruption taking place in the developing countries is calculated to be 500 million US dollars. This 
corresponds to 3.7 times the amount of global aid.209  According to our sample, the respondents in the 
public sector are more prone to corruption in terms of participating in corrupt activities. However, the 
respondents in the public sector state that there is less corruption in the society compared to the 
respondents in the private sector. 
  Individual participation in corruption The view of corruption in society 
Private sector 4.96 20.12 
Public sector 5.43 17.61 
Table 28: Average measurement for corruption in sample (occupation) 
The data information collected about occupation is divided by a system defined as International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO). This classification is a ten-level hierarchical system with detailed level 
occupational subgroups where the majority of the world’s jobs are divided into over 400 unit groups. The 
classifications are based on the skill level and skill specialization essential for each job and were 
established by the United Nations to organize data concerning the work force. This international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2009: Corruption and The Private Sector, New York; Cambridge University Press, 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/global_corruption_report_2009 
207Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2013, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results 
208Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2009: Corruption and The Private Sector, New York; Cambridge University Press, 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/global_corruption_report_2009 
209Magpile, J. and Hameed, S., (2014), Removing the Corruption Tax on the Private Sector, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
http://csis.org/publication/removing-corruption-tax-private-sector 
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classification makes it easier to compare statistics regarding occupations among countries. Each of the 
occupation groups is defined by a title and a code number and the respective codes and corresponding 
occupation for our sample can be seen in the table 29.210,211 
Code Occupation 
1 Managers 
2 Professionals 
3 Technicians Associate Professional  
4 Clerical Support Workers 
5 Service and sales workers 
6 Skilled Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Workers 
7 Craft and Related Trade Workers 
8 Plant and machine Operators and Assemblers 
9 Elementary Occupations  
0 Armed Forces Occupations  
Table 29: ISCO classification  
 
10. ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
   
 
This chapter presents the models used along with their main features and problems. Furthermore, 
estimations where the variables are tested are given and we present their significance as well as the 
results.  
 
 
10.1 Model specification  
In order to analyse the relationship between M-Pesa and corruption several model specifications are 
developed which are linked in different ways to adoption of M-Pesa and to mobile banking impact. The 
statistical inference is a two-sided hypothesis where the null hypothesis (H0) is defined as if M-Pesa has no 
effect on the extent of corruption, whether corruption is defined as an individual or society. The null 
hypothesis is tested against the alternative hypothesis (H1), which states that M-Pesa has an effect on 
corruption. The results related to the impact of M-Pesa on corruption generated by the models are captured 
by the estimated coefficient β1. If the coefficient obtains a positive and significant value, one can conclude 
that the null hypothesis can be rejected and the Kenyan financial mobile system, M-Pesa, has a positive 
impact on corruption, in terms of reduction.  
Hypothesis 
H0: M-Pesa has no effect on corruption 
H1: M-Pesa has a effect on corruption  
Table 30: Hypothesis  
The two variables for corruption are the dependent variables in this study and are estimated separately. 
Each model is estimated through six different regressions. More specifically, the models are first estimated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 International Labour Organization, (2012), International Standard Classification of Occupations, ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data  
211Ibid.   
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in their most basic form where only variables for corruption and M-Pesa are included. Additional variables 
are then gradually added to the model to control for different effects in order to generate more precise 
estimates of the causal effect from M-Pesa.  
 
The models are analysed by using two different regression models, ordered probit estimation and multiple 
linear probability model (LPM). The LPM model is ran according to the ordinary least square method (OLS) 
and the order probit model is estimated by the method of likelihood ratio (LR). The ordered probit model is 
used for ordinal dependent variables, which is the case in our study. The model estimates the effects of the 
impact from the independent variables by indicating that more than two values are indistinguishable from 
LR estimates when observing the same relationship. This model is therefore appropriate for the types of 
variables included and presents results where the underlying variables are reliably represented.  
 
The ordered probit model is written as:  
Y = φ(β´x + εi) 
Y is the dependent variable, φ is the standard normal distribution function when performing a Chi-squared 
test. β is a vector of estimated parameters which represents the effect of a change in the independent 
variables on the underlying scale, i.e. dependent variable.  In addition, x is the vector of explanatory 
variables and εi is the error term.212  
Hence, this model can only be used when the scale of the dependent variable is limited. Despite the fact 
that the ordered probit estimation is most appropriate in this case, this strategy can only be estimated for 
models where we have the measurement for individual corruption as our dependent variable. The reason is 
that the dependent variable related to the extent of corruption in the society is constructed in the sense 
where the measurement has a too broad scale. This might lead to biased results when using the ordered 
probit model and therefore LPM is constructed and used to estimate the models concerning the extent of 
corruption in the society.213  
 
The LPM is commonly used when the dependent variable is binary and takes the value zero or one but can 
also be used when the dependent variable takes more than two values. Hence, LPM requires an interval 
level measurement of the dependent variable and might not therefore be the best estimation strategy in this 
case, as our dependent variables are formed through an ordinal scale. The model also differs from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212Duncan, C., Khattak, A. and Council, F., Applying the Ordered Probit Model to Injury Severity in Truck- Passanger Car Rear-End Collision, Transportation 
Research Record 1635 Paper No. 98-1237 
213Angrist, J., (2009) Mostly harmless econometrics an empiricist’s companion. http://sfxeu05.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/46LUB?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/sfxit.com:opac_856&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&sfx.ignore_date_threshold=1&rft.object_id=2550000000005641&svc_val_fmt=info:ofi/f
mt:kev:mtx:sch_svc& 
Master’s Thesis   Isabell Johannesson 
2014  Marina Steendam 
	   59	  
order probit model in terms of the interpretation of the estimated parameters. More specifically, the 
probabilities increase linearly with the independent variables while the opposite is assumed for the order 
probit model. In other words, the relationship between the dependent and independent variables are linear 
where the conditional expectations of the dependent variable given the independent variables are 
interpreted as the conditional probability that a relationship exists when the dependent variables take 
different values. The estimated parameters are interpreted as a change in the probability that the 
dependent variables take a specific value as the independent variable changes by one unit. Despite the 
lack of success with the LPM in this case, the model is correct and acceptable for use and enough 
assumptions are taken to fulfil our criteria of estimation. 
 
We define LMP by the following:  
Y=β0 + β1x1i + β2x2i + β3x3i +…+ βkxki + εi 
Y is the dependent variable and xi  the independent variables. The parameter β is the estimated effect of 
the variables and εi is the error term which is normally distributed and also the variance of the error terms is 
constant, i.e. homoscedasticity is assumed.214 
 
10.2 Limitations of the models 
The OLS and LR methods usually estimate similar marginal-effects, hence both methods struggle with a 
sort of misclassification of the dependent variable if the data is presented according to an ordinal scale. In 
this case the dependent variables are presented on an ordinal scale and can only take specific values, 
which are determined and calculated. Thus, by using the OLS or LR estimation the value of the dependent 
variable can lie outside this scale and take a lower or higher value than given. This misclassification of the 
dependent variable yields inconsistent coefficient estimates. This problem can be controlled for, and thus it 
is easier to eliminate the bias of estimated variables when using LR compared to OLS. However, an 
attempt to control for this misclassification is presented by performing a sensitivity analysis for both 
methods further below. 215  
 
A majority of the LPM models are estimated by the OLS method due to its basic form and simplicity in 
interpreting the estimated coefficients. However the use of the LPM model is limited and is not used to the 
same extent as the order probit model, since it commonly yields biased and inconsistent estimates. One 
problem, which generates this biased inference, is related to outliers. As the data consists of observations 
with very high or small values, which distinguishes from the abnormal value, the OLS method does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214Schaffer, M., (2012), Probit better than LPM?, Mostly Harmless Econometrics, http://www.mostlyharmlesseconometrics.com/2012/07/probit-better-than-lpm/ 
215Hausman, J.A., Abrevaya, J. and Scott-Morton, F.M., (1998) 
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work properly. The reason is that these values will have disproportionally large effects on the coefficients. 
Hence, this is controlled for and further explained under the section on sensitivity analysis.216  
 
Another problem related to the LPM model, especially in this case where cross-sectional data is used, is 
that the assumption of homoscedastic disturbance is not valid. Instead it is assumed heteroskedasticity in 
the error terms indicating that the variance is not constant. In the LMP model the variance of the standard 
error is rather determined based on the value of variables that are independent.217,218 Hence, this problem 
might bias the inference of interest by under- or overestimating the coefficient estimates, which indicates 
unreliable results. The problem is difficult to control for but in order to eliminate as much bias as possible a 
robustness control variable is added.   
 
The left figure displays the squared residuals for the extent of corruption in the society. The residuals are 
graphed as a diagnostic tool and cannot be a one hundred per cent reliable measurement. However it is 
easy to observe that there is no discernible systematic pattern between the residuals and fitted values, 
which are the independent variables indicating that there is perhaps no heteroskedasticity in the data. On 
the other hand the figure on the right represents the squared residuals for the measurement instrument 
related to individual participation in corrupt activities. Here a systematic relationship between the 
independent variables and the squared residuals can be observed. There are certain kinds of negative 
linear relationship indicating possible heteroskedasticity presented in the data. Using the order probit 
model, which controls for heteroskedasticity, solves this problem.219  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Plot over the squared residuals for the extent of corruption in the society Figure 7: Plot over the squared residuals for the individual participation in corrupt activities   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216Angrist, J., (2009) Mostly harmless econometrics an empiricist’s companion. http://sfxeu05.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/46LUB?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/sfxit.com:opac_856&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&sfx.ignore_date_threshold=1&rft.object_id=2550000000005641&svc_val_fmt=info:ofi/f
mt:kev:mtx:sch_svc&  
217Pedace, R., 3 Main Linear Probability Model (LPM) Problems, Econometrics For Dummies, http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/3-main-linear-probability-
model-lpm-problems.html, 
218Gujarati, D., (2006) Essentials of Econometrics, third edition New York: McGraw-Hill. p, 202 
219Gujarati, D., (2006) Essentials of Econometrics, third edition New York: McGraw-Hill. p, 289 
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As stated above, the conditional probability changes linearly with the independent variables, which leads to 
the fact that the increasing effect of the independent variables remains constant throughout. More 
specifically, if the estimated parameters show an increase, the probability of the dependent variable 
increases linearly despite the value of the increase in the independent variable. In reality this assumption 
does not hold and instead an assumption of non-linearity is taken.220  
 
The order probit model is commonly preferred as an estimation strategy due to its credibility in estimating 
coefficients. However, there are some problems with the method and there also exists some biased 
inference when the sample is limited. But this does not dramatically change the results because the model 
is consistent.  
 
Finally, the inference might become biased as the model consists of endogenous dummy variables, in other 
words variables are correlated and dependent on other variables. This might occur since some of the 
answers of the respondents might be correlated due to clustering problems commonly referred to as the 
Moulton problem. This implies that the respondents’ answers are correlated because the respondents are 
subject to some of the same background characteristics in terms of exposing the same environmental 
influences such as the extent of corruption. Although this problem might bias the results, the collected data 
is fairly small and in such cases the clusters rarely lead to any bias changes in inference. However, in order 
to adjust for this and make the results more credible, this problem is to some extent defined by controlling 
for heterogeneity. 
 
10.3 Predictions 
In this study the hypothesis stated is that M-Pesa reduces the extent of corruption, i.e. that the coefficients 
estimated have a negative slope for the M-Pesa. The prediction is that individuals using more functions of 
M-Pesa and using it more frequently should be less involved in corruption and have a more non-tolerant 
view concerning the overall corruption situation in the country as a whole. Also, we expect individuals who 
started to use mobile banking early to be less prone to corruption and have a more positive view of 
corruption in the society than those who are later adopters. These arguments are built on the fact that as an 
individual uses the financial mobile banking the transactions will be registered and the cash flow will 
decrease, resulting in less possibility for corrupt activities.  
 
Another prediction is that employees in the public sector in comparison with the private sector are more 
corrupt. This hypothesis is built on the theory that corruption is more common in the public sector. More 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220Gujarati, D., (2006) Essentials of Econometrics, third edition New York: McGraw-Hill. p, 202 
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specifically, there is a higher possibility for corrupt activities between private and public individuals in terms 
of paying a bribe to get a benefit from the state or get out of an inconvenient situation rather than a similar 
situation between two private individuals. This in turn might be due to the fact that individuals in the public 
sector have a higher degree of power due to their working position.  
 
10.4 Regression Analysis  
In the following analysis the impact of M-Pesa on corruption is investigated and it is therefor useful to see 
the linkage between the different stages in the analysis. The first part is based on a model for each variable 
including the whole sample. The second part present three different sensitivity analyses where the 
estimations are performed for different subgroups.  
 
Important to note is that the dependent variables are formed on an ordinal scale. Therefore the computed 
R2 index is by secondary importance and not much value is put in its interpretation. In addition, the intercept 
values here have no viable practical meaning and hence is not interpreted. For the OLS estimation, a 
measurement named Root MSE standing for rot mean squared errors is also presented in the ANOVA 
tables. This index implicates that the more accurate the model is, the less error and therefor a low MSE 
value. However this index is not standardized and therefor not interpreted in our results rather only 
presented for interest.221  
 
Additionally, the variation in certain control variables appears to be less important for explaining the impact 
of M-Pesa, as observed when estimating. Therefore, the coefficients on the control variable are reported in 
Appendix B and are only distributed briefly here. 
 
10.4.1 The whole sample 
In this part the regressions are performed for the whole sample covering 204 observations. The basic data 
behind this identification strategy can be illustrated by using a two-by-two table. Table 31 displays the probit 
as well as OLS results that illustrate the identification strategy and a test of an implication of the 
assumptions made above.  
 
Our baseline specification for the LR estimates shown in first column, includes only the measurement 
instrument for individual participation in corruption and the M-Pesa index. As mentioned above, several 
control variables are then added with the aim to test how the result changes or holds as another variable is 
added or eliminated. According to the estimates M-Pesa decrease corruption in the three first model 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221Reading and using STATA output,  http://web.mit.edu/course/17/17.846/OldFiles/www/Readout.html  
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specifications, thus M-Pesa does not have statistically significant impact on corruption, although its 
estimated coefficients are in line with the theoretical approach. Note, however, that the standard error for 
the last four regressions are lower compared too the standard error in the two first model specifications. 
Despite the insignificance the control variables added have substantial explanatory power for the 
dependent variable. By including more control variables to the model the residual variance decreases 
which in turn lowers the standard error of the regression estimates.  
 
In order to explore variables that supply to other effects that might reduce corruption, two of the control 
variables in the order probit model for corruption can be further interpreted. A factor incorporated as control 
variable is gender. The estimated coefficients for gender are statically negative on the 5 per cent level. This 
gender difference in the effect of M-Pesa used on corruption may help to explain the theory where women 
are less corrupt than men. Another factor that is used for interpretation of the results are income. The 
variables for high-income have a positive value indicating that high-income respondents tend to be less 
significantly prone to corruption compered to low-income respondents.  
 
The last six columns in table 31 display the OLS coefficients for the dependent variable measuring the 
extent of corruption in the society. M-Pesa’s impact on corruption is statistically insignificant at a 10 per 
cent confidential level in 3 of 6 model specifications. More specifically, the panel sample for the OLS 
estimates that the average effect of M-Pesa across the significant values decreases corruption. 
 
The relationship between M-Pesa and corruption become insignificance when variables are added for 
additional control. As the significance drops from the variable of interest (M-Pesa) one can conclude a sign 
of problem. However, the standard errors for the M-Pesa variable is high enough which indicates that we 
cannot draw any substantive conclusion from this estimate and that this model is effectively unidentified. 
This can also be strengthened by the P-value for the regression as whole where half of the models are not 
significant indicating some problem with correlation among the variables. This might lead to the fact the 
independent variables are explaining the same part of the variation in the dependent variable, M-Pesa. This 
in turn might lead to that the explanatory power of the independent variables being divided up among 
them.222  
  Dependent variable: Individual participation Dependent variable: The extent of  
  in corrupt activities  corruption in the society  
  Probit OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mpesasoc -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  0.00  0.01 0.01  -0.15* -0.15* -0.17* -0.13 -0.12 -0.14 
  (0.21) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222Reading and using STATA output,  http://web.mit.edu/course/17/17.846/OldFiles/www/Readout.html 
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Gender   -0.37**  -0.36**  -0.46*** -0.43*** -0.44***    -0.38  -0.38 -0.59 -0.56 -0.54 
    (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)   (0.58) (0.58) (0.57) (0.62) (0.61) 
Young     0.74*  0.90** 0.96**  0.92**      -1.65 -1.12 -1.08 -0.91 
      (0.45) (0.41) (0.41) (0.43)     (1.78) (1.90) -194 (1.94) 
Middle     0.43  0.68  0.71  0.67      -1.39 -0.55 -0.57 -0.53 
      (0.46) (0.43) (0.43) (0.45)     (1.83) (1.96) (2.01) (2.00) 
Income1       0.57 0.52  0.57       1.74 1.63 1.65 
        (0.22) (0.22) (0.25)       (0.77) (0.78) (0.86) 
Incom2       0.66*** 0.62***  0.67***        2.37*** 2.39*** 2.29*** 
        (0.22) (0.24) (0.24)       (0.83) (0.83) (0.81) 
Income3       0.59*** 0.53** 0.53**       0.93** 0.97** 1.10* 
        (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)       (0.76) (0.78) (0.79) 
ISCED2         0.32  0.30          0.91 1.04 
          (0.37) (0.36)         (1.24) (1.13) 
ISCED5         0.23  0.22          1.22 1.26 
          (0.35) (0.35)         (1.16) (1.01) 
ISCED7         0.09  0.07          0.77 0.88 
          (0.35) (0.35)         (1.23) (1.08) 
Other education         0.40  0.34          2.23 2.41* 
          (0.51) (0.50)         (1.56) (1.43) 
ISCO2           -0.42            -2.02 
            (0.48)           (1.93) 
ISCO3           -0.42            1.68 
            (0.48)           (1.95) 
ISCO5           -0.22            0.43 
            (0.39)           (1.77) 
Other occupation           0.31            0.51 
             (0.44)           (-1.89) 
Sample Core Core Core Core Core Full Core Core Core Core Core Full 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
R2 0.0004 0.0082 0.0139 0.0322 0.0344 0.0361 0.0166 0.0186 0.0227 0.0668 0.0748 0.0920 
Pseudo R2 0.0004 0.0082 0.0139 0.0322 0.0344 0.0361 0.0166 0.0186 0.0227 0.0668 0.0748 0.0920 
Root MSE             4.1147 4.1207 4.1327 4.0692 4.0937 4.0984 
Table 31: The whole sample. Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
 
10.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
Quantitative methods that are controlled for systematic error and biases in the study baseline results are 
proved to be less statistically successful compared to methods which assume random errors. However, it is 
of importance to define various sources of errors in order to motivate possible uncertainties of the results. 
Therefore a sensitivity analysis is motivated and can be defined as an extension of the method 
characterized by discussions of different results. In order to correct for possible robustness such as 
unobserved heterogeneity in the above-presented results, a sensitivity analysis is performed in terms of 
correction of data as well as estimations of complementary approaches. In this analysis assumptions, 
which are related to the dependent variables, are violated. Any errors and unidentified causal effect can 
then hopefully be estimated and corrected, as the analysis is re-estimated. 223,224 There are three different 
types of sensitive analysis completed.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223Greenland, S., (1996), Basic Methods for Sensitivity Analysis of Biases, International Journal of Epidemiology Vol. 25, No.6 
224Leone, A., Minutti-Meza, M. and Wasley, C., (2013), Influential Observations and Inference in Accounting Research, 
https://business.uoregon.edu/sites/business1.uoregon.edu/files/media/andrew-leone-accounting-research-wkshop-2013-11.pdf 
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10.5.1 Sensitivity analysis with outliers: Subgroups   
The first sensitivity analysis performed is made by dividing the sample into two different groups, public and 
private employed. More specifically, one group consists of respondents that worked in the public sector and 
one group consists of respondents belonging to the private sector. The first group for public officials covers 
23 respondents and the second subgroup covers 181 individuals. The results for each group is then 
compared to the results estimated for the baseline sample. 
 
Table 32 reports the estimations for the dependent variable measuring the individual participation in corrupt 
activities. The coefficient estimated for M-Pesa for both subgroups are similar to those found in the baseline 
sample. Thus, none of those were statistically significant.  
Explanatory Dependent variable: Individual  Dependent variable: Individual  
Variable  participation in corrupt activities  participation in corrupt activities  
  Public Private 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mpesasoc -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 0.06 0.10 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Sample Core Core Core Core Core Full Core Core Core Core Core Full 
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 181 181 181 181 181 181 
Table 32: Subgroups- corruption individual. Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
 
Table 33 provides a rough comparison of the overall magnitudes of the six estimates of M-Pesa impact on 
the extent of corruption in the society for both subgroups. As we compare public and private employees it 
shows that M-Pesa reduces corruption more in the public sector, even if this is an insignificant relationship. 
However, as can be observed the effects shown in last model specification regarding public servants takes 
the highest value and is also significant at the 10 per cent confidence level.  
Explanatory Dependent variable: The extent of  Dependent variable: The extent of  
Variable  corruption in the society  corruption in the society  
  Public Private 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mpesasoc -0.56 -0.49 -0.54 -0.43 -0.53 -0.62* -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 
  (0.39) (0.37) (0.40) (0.37) (0.35) (0.30) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Sample Core Core Core Core Core Full Core Core Core Core Core Full 
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 181 181 181 181 181 181 
Table 33: Subgroups- corruption society. Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
 
10.5.2 Sensitivity analysis with outliers: Reduce the scale  
Another sensitive analysis, which is performed in order to attempt to determine the underlying impact on 
the baseline results, is made by reducing the scales of the answering choices. As explained above, both 
dependent variables for corruption are based on questions that have multiple-choice alternatives. Instead of 
using a four-scale answer choice, the index related to the individual participation in corrupt activities is 
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transformed and instead only consists of three-scale answering choices. In this case the answering 
alternatives ¨very often¨ are assigned the value 0. The initial scale for the index runs between 3-12 and 
consequently in this case the measurement takes the value between 3-9, where the value 3 indicates no 
corruption and 9 indicates corruption.  In the same way, the scale is transformed for the index regarding the 
extent of corruption in the society where the question under theme 4 with five-scale answering alternatives 
is decreased to a three-scale. For theme 6 related to inconvenient situations, the four-scale answering 
alternatives are reduced to a three-scale answering choice. Previously the measurement ran between 6-28 
and in this analysis it takes the value between 8-18. Therefore, the number of observations has decreased 
from 204 to 195 in this case.  
 
In this analysis the panel sample presented in table 34 estimates imply that the average effect of M-Pesa 
across the six model specifications for the probit model decrease corruption. According to the coefficients 
M-Pesa decrease corruption by 0.03 percentage points on average, note however, M-Pesa does not have 
a statistically significant impact, although its estimated coefficients are as expected negative. In the second 
model, the OLS estimates indicates the same pattern, thus 3 of 6 model specifications are significant.  
 
In addition, based on the OLS sample, at a low level of education the impact of M-Pesa increases 
corruption, which is according to the abovementioned theory. As 30 per cent of the sample is low educated 
one can conclude that the public policy in Kenya to enhance the populations’ education, as mentioned in 
section 3, is very important in order to reduce the extent of corruption in the country. 
Explanatory Dependent variable: Individual  Dependent variable: The extent of  
Variable  participation in corrupt activities  corruption in the society  
  Probit OLS 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mpesasoc -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 -0.12 -0.14* -0.11 -0.12* -0.11* 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
ISCED2         0.21 0.18         2.20*** 1.91** 
          (0.37) (0.28)         (0.82) (0.79) 
Sample Core Core Core Core Core Full Core Core Core Core Core Full 
N 196 196 196 196 196 196 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Table 34: Reduce the scale. Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
 
10.5.3 Sensitivity analysis without outliers: Controlling for outliers  
In this part of the sensitivity analysis well-known observations, which may influence the results of the study, 
are eliminated. In order to perform this sensitivity analysis an alternative index for the two dependent 
variables are generated again. This process is based on controlling for observations for the dependent 
variable that lie an abnormal distance from other observations in the sample and are defined as outliers. 
More specifically the observations that are remarkably large or small compared to other observations are 
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eliminated. Graphing the data for the two corruption measurements presented in figure 8 and 9, one can 
observe the behaviour of the data and eliminate the outliers. Note, however, that graphing the outliers is 
only a simple diagnostic tool used to generate a clear picture about the outliers in this data set. Thus, even 
if outliers generally are biased observations, it is important to emphasize and carefully control for these 
observations because they can contain valuable information about the relationship investigated. 225 
Therefore, in order to strengthen which observations are outliers, a common model is used where 
observations showing two standard deviations from the mean of the dependent variables are excluded.226  
Figure 8: Outliers for individual participation in corrupt activities     Figure 9: Outliers for the extent of corruption in the society 
The ordinary scale for the measurement related to individual participation in corruption was 3-12, and after 
elimination of the outliers the new scale is calculated to run between 4 and11. The same calculations are 
made for the measurement regarding the extent of corruption in society where the initial scale ran between 
6 and 28 and in this analysis it takes the values between 15 and 25. Hence, both dependent variables are 
built in the same way and consist of the same variables as presented previously.  
 
In both cohorts presented in table 35, in average the impact of M-Pesa decreases corruption. However, 
even if the M-Pesa index used in this model is operated to target more precise measurements regarding 
the impact of M-Pesa on corruption there is no significant relationship.  
Explanatory Dependent variable: Individual  Dependent variable: The extent of  
Variable  participation in corrupt activities  corruption in the society  
  Probit OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mpesasoc -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Sample Core Core Core Core Core Full Core Core Core Core Core Full 
N 124 124 124 124 124 124 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Table 35: Controlling for outliers. Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. Robust standard error in parentheses. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225Angrist, J., (2009) Mostly harmless econometrics an empiricist’s companion. http://sfxeu05.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/46LUB?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/sfxit.com:opac_856&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&sfx.ignore_date_threshold=1&rft.object_id=2550000000005641&svc_val_fmt=info:ofi/f
mt:kev:mtx:sch_svc& 
226Field, A, (2005). “Discovering Statistics Using SPSS”, Second edition, London: Sage Publications, London 
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11. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SOME THEORY CONCLUSIONS 
This final chapter presents a conclusion of our topic, discussion of our results and lastly a suggestion for 
future studies within the field. 
 
In this paper we have studied if M-Pesa has any effect on corruption in Kenya by performing several 
estimations. We have collected the data for these estimations by handing out questioners to people living in 
Nairobi.  
 
In the two first regressions, which covered the whole sample, no stable relationship between M-Pesa and 
corruption could be observed with the exemption from the first three model specifications regarding the 
extent of corruption in the Kenyan society. When the models are controlled for omitted effect of different 
characteristics, the estimations shrink to result in a pattern of negative correlation between observed levels 
of output for M-Pesa and supposed corruption. In addition, these results show that M-Pesa to some extent 
work as an anti-corruption tool. However, one should note that most of these negative coefficient 
estimations are not signification despite the fact the model specifications include control variables. 
 
The resulting complex of insignificant independent variables is difficult to analyse with conventional 
methods of a qualitative study, as it is prone to include effects that are not covered. More specifically, a 
number of hard catch theoretical and practical reasons related to the data set might account for the 
difficulty in identifying a significant relationship between M-Pesa and corruption. One example, which might 
be a keystone for the bias result, can be explained by the mischaracterization of the problem of corruption. 
The estimations are based on self-reported questionnaires, which might have led to the variables included 
being strongly dependent on each other. More ordinary problems of the generated measurements are also 
likely to have contributed to mediocre empirical results in this area due to the fact that the measurement 
instrument represents a complex phenomenon. Sensitivity analyses are therefore presented with the aim of 
challenging such difficulties. Note that the sensitivity analyses have produced less vigorous and more 
ambiguous results where M-Pesa decreases both indexes for corruption. Although the relationship between 
the observed factors concurs with the economic theory and our expectations, the results are still 
insignificant and indicate that one needs to be careful when drawing substantive conclusions from the 
estimates. In addition, one can to some extent conclude that the sensitive analyses have not succeeded in 
taking different effects into account, which makes the models unidentified.  
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The extensive literature regarding the economic theories in terms of the decision-making models helps to 
explain why M-Pesa has largely failed to work as an anti-corruption tool. More specifically, our estimations 
reveal that the Kenyan context of corruption can be observed within a collective choice framework instead 
of a principle-agent problem. As a matter of accounting, the major source of the failure of M-Pesa according 
to the theory is that the costs of fighting corruption outweigh the benefits. In addition, this collective-action 
theory states that in a context where corruption is not seen as an exception, but instead as a prevailing 
rule, the establishment of reforms for fighting corruption is usually hard. Even if the Kenyan population 
morally disapprove of corruption and are fully aware of the consequences, the anti-corruption efforts and 
controlling measurements will not be effective, since no one is willing to take responsibility or fight 
corruption. This leads to the breakdown of the anti-corruption strategy of M-Pesa.  
 
To continue, there is limited access to previous studies in this area, which makes it difficult to determine 
which variables should be identified as key drivers for both M-Pesa and corruption. Despite the fact that 
there is no clear evidence of a direct effect of M-Pesa on measured corruption, there are studies that have 
looked separately at the effects of M-Pesa on economic factors. These have shown more promising results, 
for example that M-Pesa increases economic growth.  
 
Finally, a recurring theme in both the theoretical discussion of corruption and related empirical studies 
shows a close relationship between corruption and the governmental sector. The reason is that many of the 
opportunities for corrupt activates are created in these sectors due to the lack of institutional rules and 
transparency in accounting.227 In order to check if this pattern can be observed in our thesis, estimations 
have been made where the data set was divided into two different subgroups. More specifically, 
regressions were made separately for respondents in the public and private sectors. However, these 
estimations have also fallen short of identifying with precision the relationship between M-Pesa and the 
extent of corruption in Kenya. Note, however, that the relationship was still negative but not significant 
except for the regressions in section 10.6.1 regarding public employees. This result shows that 
respondents from the public sector using M-Pesa have a negative impact on the corruption index in terms 
of reducing corruption. This implies a signal that improving governance structure in Kenya leads to less 
corruption.  
 
Our understanding of the relationship between M-Pesa and corruption remains limited as one can conclude 
that the negative correlation is insignificant and one cannot rely on a clear demonstration of a strong link 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227OECD (2010), Issues paper on corruption and economic growth,  http://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/anti-corruption/Issue-Paper-Corruption-and-Economic-
Growth.pdf  
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between M-Pesa performances and reducing corruption. Further support for a strong anti-corruption policy 
in terms of M-Pesa is however desired in order to create evidence that financial mobile banking reduces the 
damaging effect in terms of corruption. This relationship can be revolutionary due to the importance for a 
sustainable and justifiable development. In order to generate variables that make the output more reliable, 
we believe that the relationship should be studied for a longer period of time. Additionally, in order to study 
changes in corruption and how the phenomenon changes over time, a better option would perhaps be to 
study a sample of individuals regularly.  
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13. APPENDIX A 
Table 1: 
Variable Definition Expected 
Relationship  
Identification number Each respondents gets a number, 1-204   
Occupation 1= Student, 2=Business, 3=Education, 4=Security, 5=Service, 6=Hospital, 7=Financial, 8=Retail, 9= Other +/- 
ISCO2 International Standard Classification of Occupation where class 2 responds to professionals 
   If class 2 it yields 1 otherwise 0    
ISCO3 International Standard Classification of Occupation where class 3 responds to Technicians and associate 
professionals. If class 3 it yields 1 otherwise 0. 
 ISCO4 International Standard Classification of Occupation where class 4 responds to clerical support workers. If 
class 4 it yields 1 otherwise 0 
 ISCO5 International Standard Classification of Occupation where class 5 responds to service and sales workers. If 
class 5 it yields 1 otherwise 0  
 Other occupation Respondents that have other occupation. If other occupation it yields 1 otherwise 0 
 Gender 1 if Male or 0 if Female +/- 
Age 1=18-25, 2=26-33, 3=34-41, 4=42-48. 5=49-56, 6=57- + 
Age squared All variables for age are squared  
 Young Dummy: Respondents between age 0-33. If age 0-33 it yields 1 otherwise 0.  
 Middle Dummy: Respondents between age 34-48.  If age 34-48 it yields 1 otherwise 0.  
 Older Dummy: Respondents age 49 or older. If age 49 or older it yields 1 otherwise 0.  
 Income Monthly income: 1=0-3000, 2=3001-6000, 3=6001-9000, 4=9001-12000, 5=12001-15000, 6=15001-18000, 
7=18000- + 
Income 1 Dummy: Monthly income between 0-6000. If income between 0-6000 it yields 1 otherwise 0, 
 Income2 Dummy: Monthly income between 6001-12000. If income between 60001-12000 it yields 1 otherwise 0.  
 Inomce3 Dummy: Monthly income between 12001-18000. If income between 12001-18000 it yields 1 otherwise 0.  
 Income4 Dummy: Monthly income over 18000. If income is over 18000 it yields 1 otherwise 0.  
 Education 1= No education, 2=Primary, 3=Secondary, 4=Tertiary, 5=Post-Graduate, 6=Other  - 
ISCED1 Dummy: International Standard Classification of Education where class 1 responds to primary. If class 1 it 
yields 1 otherwise 0.  
 ISCED2 Dummy: International Standard Classification of Education where class 2 includes (in our data) class 3 and 
4 and responds to lower and upper as well as post secondary education. If class 2 it yields 1 otherwise 0 
 ISCED5 Dummy: International Standard Classification of Education where class 5 includes (in our data) class 6 and 
responds to first and second stage tertiary education 
   If class 5 it yields 1 otherwise 0.   
ISCED7 Dummy: International Standard Classification of Education where class7 responds to Post-Graduate. If 
class 7 it yields 1 otherwise 0 
 Other education Dummy: Education that is not capture in ISCED classification for our sample  
   If other education it yields 1 otherwise 0   
No education  Dummy: Respondents that have no education. If no education it yields 1 otherwise 0   
 Mobile phone If Yes it yields 1 otherwise 0 - 
M-Pesa If Yes it yields 1 otherwise 0 - 
Purpose 1 Transfer money to other people - 
Purpose 2 Savings - 
Purpose 3 Receive Wages - 
Purpose 4 Pay Wages - 
Purpose 5 Buy Airtime - 
Purpose 6 Use when traveling  - 
Purpose 7 Pay bills - 
Purpose 8 Buy goods and services - 
Purpose 9  Withdraw from ATM - 
Purpose 10 Receive Payments - 
Purpose 11 Make donations - 
Measurement of purpose Sum of al purpose for each individual  
 
Usage 
Frequency of use: - 
1=Every day, 2=2-4times/week, 3=less than 3 times/week, 4=less than 1 time/month   
Start 
Start using M-Pesa:  - 
1=2007, 2=2008, 3=2009, 4=2010, 5=2011, 6=2012, 7=2013, 8=2014   
Measurement of M-Pesa Including purpose 1-11, usage and start - 
  Takes value between 4-22: 4 is less frequent user and 22 is more frequent user   
Measurement of M-Pesa Each variable for measurement of M-Pesa is squared  
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squared 
Transaction 1 Value of the respondents last transaction 
 Transaction 2 Value of the respondents second last transaction  
 Public sector 1 if the respondent works in public sector, 0 otherwise + 
Keep work Ordinal: 1= Sure, 2=Quite sure, 3=Quite Unsure, 4=Unsure 
 Friends public sector If the respondents have friends in the public sector it yields 1, otherwise 0.  
 Same position 1 if the respondent have the same position as he/she, 0 otherwise 
 Trusted 
If people in general can be trusted:  
 1= Strongly Agree 2=disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly disagree    
Use Position 1 Possibility for public officer to use his/her position of power for private gain 
   1=Very difficult 2=Difficult, 3=Possible, 4=Easy, 5=Very easy   
Use position 2 Possibility for public officer at a higher level to use his/her position of power for private gain. 1=Very difficult 
2=Difficult, 3=Possible, 4=Easy, 5=Very easy 
 Dishonesty Public officers are in general dishonest: 1=Never, 2=No, 3=To some extent, 4=Yes, 5=Very Much 
 Give Bribe 
Possibility for one to give a bribe in order to get out of a inconvenient situation:  
 1=Unlikely, 2=Sometime, 3=Likely, 4=Very likely   
Demand Bribe 
Possibility that public officer demand bribe: 
 1=Unlikely, 2=Sometime, 3=Likely, 4=Very likely   
Corruption society Measurement for corruption in the society. Takes value between 6-28 
   A value of 6 indicates no corruption and 28 indicates high corruption    
Offered a bribe 
How often the respondent has been offered a bribe:  
 1=Never, 2=Sometime, 3=Often, 4=Very Often 
 Accept bribe 
How often the respondent would accept a offered bribe: 
 1=Never, 2=Sometime, 3=Often, 4=Very Often   
Demand bribe 
How often the respondent would demand a bribe: 
 1=Never, 2=Sometime, 3=Often, 4=Very Often   
Corruption individual  Measurement for individual participation in corrupt activities. Takes value between 3-12  
   A value of 3 indicates no corrupt activity and 28 indicates high participation in corrupt activities    
 
Table 2 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Identification number 204 102.5 59.03 1 204 
Occupation 204 5.81 2.96 1 9 
ISCO2 204 0.83 0.28 0 1 
ISCO3 204 0.11 0.32 0 1 
ISCO4 204 0.03 0.17 0 1 
ISCO5 204 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Other occupation 204 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Gender 204 1.45 0.50 1 2 
Age 204 2.97 1.02 2 7 
Age squared 204 9.86 7.54 4 49 
Young 204 0.76 0.43 0 1 
Middle 204 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Older 204 0.02 0.16 0 1 
Income 204 4.66 2.35 1 7 
Income1 204 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Income 2 204 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Income 3 204 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Income 4 204 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Education 204 4.17 0.94 1 6 
ISCED 1 204 0.20 0.14 0 1 
ISCED 2 204 0.21 0.41 0 1 
ISCED 5 204 0.37 0.48 0 1 
ISCED 7 204 0.34 0.48 0 1 
Other education 204 0.05 0.22 0 1 
No education 204 0.01 0.99 0 1 
Mobile phone 204 1 0 1 1 
M-Pesa 204 1 0 1 1 
Transfer money 181 1 0 1 1 
Savings 82 1 0 1 1 
Receive Wages 21 1 0 1 1 
Pay Wages 31 1 0 1 1 
Buy Airtime 149 1 0 1 1 
Use when travelling 55 1 0 1 1 
Pay bills 111 1 0 1 1 
Buy goods and services 59 1 0 1 1 
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Withdraw from ATM 31 1 0 1 1 
Receive Payments 82 1 0 1 1 
Make Donations 41 1 0 1 1 
Measurement for purpose 204 4.13 2.30 1 11 
Usage 204 2.12 0.81 1 4 
Start 204 3.05 1.95 1 8 
Measurement for M-Pesa 204 12.97 3.51 4 22 
Measurement of M-Pesa squared  204 180.53 5.65 16 484 
Transaction 1 204 3.19 2.06 1 8 
Transaction 2 204 2.68 1.86 0 7 
Public sector 204 1.89 0.32 1 2 
Keep work 25 2.92 1.00 1 4 
Friends public sector 25 1.04 0.20 1 2 
Sane position 25 1.60 0.50 1 2 
Trusted 204 3.26 1.04 1 5 
Use position 1 204 3.50 1.07 1 5 
Use position 2 204 3.75 1.09 1 5 
Dishonesty  204 3.33 0.89 1 5 
Give Bribe 204 3.06 0.91 1 4 
Demand bribe 204 2.93 0.99 1 4 
Corruption Society 204 19.84 4.14 6 28 
Offered a bribe 204 1.80 0.84 1 4 
Accept bribe 204 1.80 0.93 1 4 
Demand bribe 204 1.41 0.76 1 4 
Corruption Individual 204 5.01 2.13 0 12 
Table 8: Descriptive statistic for the whole sample 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Dependent variable: Individual participation in corrupt activities. 
Public respondents          
Explanatory variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mpesasoc -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 0.06 0.10 0.08 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Gender   -0.68 -0.79* -1.03** -1.45*** -3.54*** 
    (0.45) (0.44) (0.52) (0.55) (0.93) 
Young     0.67 1.42* 2.45*** 2.62*** 
      (0.43) (0.84) (0.79) (0.85) 
Middle     -0.08 1.40* 3.50*** 3.16*** 
      (0.41) (0.75) (1.12) (1.20) 
Income1       2.51** 2.96*** 4.45*** 
        (1.05) (0.92) (1.20) 
Incom2       1.34** 1.71** 1.81* 
        (0.60) (0.88) (1.13) 
Income3       1.58** 1.95*** 2.82*** 
        (0.68) (0.60) (0.64) 
ISCED2         N/A N/A 
          - - 
ISCED5         0.08 0.02 
          (0.68) (0.82) 
ISCED7         -1.53** -2.43*** 
          (0.63) (0.79) 
Othereducation         N/A N/A 
          - - 
ISCO2           -0.21 
            (0.51) 
ISCO3           -3.79*** 
            (1.28) 
ISCO5           -2.37*** 
            (0.92) 
Otheroccupation           -2.58*** 
            (0.78) 
Sample Core Core Core Core Core Full 
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Prob>chi2 0.5623 0.2483 0.0815 0.0046 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0041 0.0296 0.0524 0.1552 0.2212 0.3193 
Constant             
Cut1 -1.46 -2.95 -2.04 0.64 1.26 -4.45 
  (1.60) (1.77) (1.86) (2.30) (2.34) (3.10) 
Cut2 -1.10 -2.57 -1.65 1.14 1.86 -3.64 
  (1.57) (1.75) (1.85) (2.33) (2.32) (3.03) 
Cut3 -0.65 -2.09 -1.13 1.86 2.64 -2.55 
  1.53 (1.70) (1.81) (2.32) (2.31) (2.84) 
Cut4 -0.16 -1.57 -0.56 4.56 3.41 -1.37 
  (1.51) (1.66) (1.80) (2.35) (2.39) (2.87) 
Cut5 0.34 -1.03 0.00 3.17 4.05 -0.62 
  (1.52) (1.63) (1.79) (2.36) (2.42) (2.81) 
Cut6 0.59 -0.77 0.27 3.49 4.41 -0.31 
  (1.47) (1.58) (1.75) (2.35) (2.27) (2.68) 
Cut7 0.95 -0.43 0.62 3.92 4.94 0.13 
  (1.53) (1.57) (1.80) (2.46) (2.28) (2.70) 
Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
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Dependent variable: Individual participation in corrupt activities. 
Private respondents          
Explanatory variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mpesasoc -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Gender   -0.35** -0.34** -0.44*** -0.41** -0.42** 
    (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Young     0.93 1.07* 1.15** 1.18** 
      (0.63) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) 
Middle     0.66 0.84 0.86 0.88  
      (0.65) (0.60) (0.59) (0.60) 
Income1       0.48 0.44 0.45 
        (0.23) (0.23) (0.26) 
Incom2       0.63*** 0.60** 0.62** 
        (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) 
Income3       0.51** 0.45* 0.38* 
        (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) 
ISCED2         0.27 0.26 
          (0l37) (0.36) 
ISCED5         0.14 0.12 
          (0.35) (0.34) 
ISCED7         0.31 0.03 
          (0.36) (0.35) 
Othereducation         0.37 0.40 
          (0.49) (0.50) 
ISCO2           0.42 
            (0.74) 
ISCO3           0.37 
            (0.72) 
ISCO5           0.70 
            (0.66) 
Otheroccupation           0.62 
            (0.70) 
Sample Core Core Core Core Core Full 
N 181 181 181 181 181 181 
Prob>chi2 0.5808 0.0845 0.0626 0.0042 0.0304 0.0812 
Pseudo R2 0.0005 0.0079 0.0135 0.0285 0.0307 0.0342 
Constant             
Cut1 -0.44 -1.02 -0.07 0.35 0.65 1.37 
  (0.31) (0.42) (0.79) (0.77) (0.86) (1.14) 
Cut2 -0.24 -0.82 0.14 0.56 0.86 1.59 
  (0.31) (0.42) (0.79) (0.77) (0.86) (1.14) 
Cut3 0.12 -0.44 0.51 0.94 1.25 1.97 
  (0.31) (0.42) (0.80) (0.77) (0.86) (1.14) 
Cut4 0.74 0.18 1.13 1.58 1.89 2.62 
  (0.30) (0.41) (0.78) (0.76) (0.85) (1.13) 
Cut5 1.06 0.50 1.47 1.92 2.23 2.97 
  (0.31) (0.42) (0.79) (0.77) (0.85) (1.13) 
Cut6 1.34 0.80 1.76 2.22 2.53 3.27 
  (0.31) (0.42) (0.80) (0.77) (0.86) (1.14) 
Cut7 1.60 1.06 2.03 2.50 2.82 3.55 
  (0.29) (0.41) (0.78) (0.75) (0.85) (1.13) 
Cut8 1.75 1.21 2.19 2.66 2.98 3.71 
  (0.30 (0.40) (0.78) (0.75) (0.85) (1.13) 
Cut9 2.12 1.59 2.57 3.04 3.36 4.10 
  (0.35) (0.46) (0.81) (0.80) (0.88) (1.16) 
Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
  
Dependent variable: The extent of corruption in society public          
Explanatory variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mpesasoc -0.56 -0.49 -0.54 -0.43 -0.53 -0.62* 
  (0.39) (0.37) (0.40) (0.37) (0.35) (0.30) 
Gender   1.93 2.05 3.54* 4.80** 4.04* 
    (1.69) (1.89) (1.67) (1.61) (1.82) 
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Young     -1.02 -0.85 -4.30* -0.85 
      (2.11) (2.21) (2.20) (1.05) 
Middle     -0.43 1.85 -2.97 1.51 
      (1.72) (.2.72) (2.32) ((2.17) 
Income1       0.16 0.61 3.90* 
        (2.50) (2.58) (1.81) 
Incom2       9.02*** 7.06*** 8.92*** 
        (1.77) (1.82) (1.70) 
Income3       3.24 2.66 3.73*** 
        (2.17) (1.59) (1.15) 
ISCED2         N/A N/A 
          - - 
ISCED5         -5.52** -2.96*** 
          (2.08) (0.83) 
ISCED7         1.86 0.54 
          (1.88) (1.08) 
Othereducation         N/A N/A 
          - - 
ISCO2           3.32 
            (2.10) 
ISCO3           4.04 
            (2.74) 
ISCO5           0.91 
            (1.77) 
Otheroccupation           -2.58 
            (1.77) 
Sample Core Core Core Core Core Full 
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Prob>F 0.1603 0.0899 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
R-squared 0.1242 0.1845 0.1898 0.5557 0.6878 0.8673 
Root MSE 3.7959 3.7533 3.9434 3.1989 2.8804 2.2572 
Constant 25.77*** 21.73*** 23.08*** 16.51* 23.06*** 17.67** 
  (5.29) (6.69) (7.42) (7.80) (7.17) (.6.78) 
Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: The extent of corruption in society         
Explanatory variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mpesasoc -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Gender   -0.59 -0.63 -0.86 -0.82 -0.76 
    (0.62) (0.61) (0.60) (0.66) (0.67) 
Young     -2.59 -2.06 -2.17 -2.27 
      (1.72) (1.87) (1.93) (1.68) 
Middle     -2.09 -1.34 -1.47 -1.70 
      (1.78) (1.94) (2.00) (1.75) 
Income1       1.74 1.63 1.35 
        (0.76) (1.75) (0.84) 
Incom2       1.95** 2.04** 1.74* 
        (0.88) (0.87) (0.89) 
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Income3       0.64 0.81 1.04 
        (0.86) (0.88) (0.89) 
ISCED2         1.03 1.12 
          (1.18) (1.07) 
ISCED5         1.69 1.73* 
          (1.08) (0.93) 
ISCED7         1.13 1.10 
          (1.22) (1.05) 
Othereducation         2.31 2.51* 
          (1.49) (1.37) 
ISCO2           0.65 
            (1.97) 
ISCO3           1.01 
            (1.86) 
ISCO5           -0.82 
            (1.61) 
Otheroccupation           -0.17 
            (1.75) 
Sample Core Core Core Core Core Full 
N 181 181 181 181 181 181 
Prob>F 0.2911 0.3816 0.3309 0.0960 0.1422 0.1292 
R-squared 0.0066 0.0116 0.0218 0.0601 0.0711 0.012 
Root MSE 4.0826 4.0837 4.0856 4.0393 4.063 4.0672 
Constant 21.31*** 22.26*** 24.98*** 23.37*** 21.96*** 22.67*** 
  (1.16) (1.58) (2.31) (2.47) (2.80) (3.28) 
Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: Individual participation in corrupt activities         
Explanatory variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mpesasoc -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Gender   -0.33** -0.33** -0.42** -0.39** -0.40** 
    (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
Young     0.58 0.75* 0.79** 0.69 
      (0.45) (0.40) (0.40) (0.43) 
Middle     0.43 0.66 0.67 0.58 
      (0.46) (0.42) (0.43) (0.46) 
Income1       0.40* 0.34 0.39 
        (0.22) (0.23) (0.25) 
Incom2       0.61*** 0.59** 0.63** 
        (0.23) (0.25) (0.26) 
Income3       0.53** 0.50** 0.48** 
        (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) 
ISCED2         0.21 0.18 
          (0.37) (0.28) 
ISCED5         0.27 0,24 
          (0.35) (0.36) 
ISCED7         0.03 -0.02 
          (0.35) (0.36) 
Othereducation         0.46 0.37 
          (0.51) (0.52) 
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ISCO2           -0.41 
            (0.48) 
ISCO3           -0.72 
            (0.45) 
ISCO5           -0.32 
            (0.38) 
Otheroccupation           -0.40 
            (0.43) 
Sample Core Core Core Core Core Full 
N 195 195 195 195 195 195 
Prob>chi2 0.1580 0.0571 0.0816 0.0027 0.113 235 
Pseudo R2 0.0034 0.0104 0.0130 0.0284 0.0321 0.0364 
Constant             
Cut1 -0.69 -1.23 -0.63 -0.21 0.10 -0.39 
  (0.32) (0.43) (0.64) (0.63) (0.74) (0.91) 
Cut2 -0.46 -1.01 -0.41 0.03 0.34 -0.15 
  (0.32) (0.43) (0.64) (0.63) (0.74) (0.90) 
Cut3 -0.07 -0.61 -0.00 0.44 0.76 0.27 
  (0.31) (0.42) (0.63) (0.63) (0.74) (0.90) 
Cut4 0.61 0.08 0.68 1.14 1.47 0.99 
  (0.32) (0.42) (0.63) (0.63) (0.74) (0.90) 
Cut5 1.06 0.53 1.14 1.61 1.94 1.46 
  (0.34) (0.44) (0.64) (0.65) (0.75) (0.91) 
Cut6 1.55 1.04 1.65 2.12 2.45 1.97 
  (0.36) (0.47) (0.67) (0.68) (0.78) (0.94) 
Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: The extent of corruption in society         
Explanatory variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mpesasoc -0.11 -0.12 -0.14* -0.11 -0.12* -0.11 
  (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Gender   -0.37 -0.38 -0.64 -0.34 -0.39 
    (0.56)  (0.55) (0.59) (0.59) (0.60) 
Young     -2.06* -1.26 -1.00 -1.12 
      (1.05) (0.99) (1.31) (1.36) 
Middle     -1.73 -0.86 -0.40 -0.59 
      (1.10) (1.00) (1.42) (1.43) 
Income1       0.91 0.95 1.06 
        (0.82) (0.78)  (0.98) 
Incom2       1.60** 1.95** 1.81** 
        (0.65) (0.84)  (0.89) 
Income3       1.07 1.23 1.25 
        (0.71) (0.95) (0.98) 
ISCED2         2.20*** 1.91** 
          (0.82) (0.79) 
ISCED5         0.29 0.10 
          (0.87) (0.84) 
ISCED7         1.53 -1.52 
          (1.06) (1.01) 
Othereducation         0.39 -0.45 
          (1.70) (1.71) 
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ISCO2           -3.69 
            (3.29) 
ISCO3           0.03 
            (2.07) 
ISCO5           0.52 
            (1.92) 
Otheroccupation           0.44 
            (2.05) 
Sample Core Core Core Core Core Full 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Prob>F 0.1592 0.1928 0.2039 0.1522 0.0243 0.0393 
R-squared 0.0305 0.0364 0.0566 0.1092 0.2110 0.2909 
Root MSE 2.3766 2.3858 2.394 2.3778 2.3079 2.2608 
Constant 17.15*** 17.73*** 19.96*** 18.48*** 18.94*** 18.62*** 
  (1.07) (1.12) (1.70) (1.57) (1.94) (2.83) 
 Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: Individual participation in corrupt activities         
Explanatory variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mpesasoc -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Gender   -0.30 -0.28 -0.35* -0.31 -0.32 
    (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Young     0.44 0.60** 0.68*** 0.57** 
      (0.28) (0.29) (0.22) (0.26) 
Middle     0.17 0.34 0.38 0.25 
      (0.33) (0.34) (0.29) (0.35) 
Income1       0.22 0.23 0.14 
        (0.26) (0.26) (0.30) 
Incom2       0.35 0.30 0.23 
        (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) 
Income3       0.32 0.21 0.17 
        (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) 
ISCED2         0.82 0.78 
          (0.53) (0.52) 
ISCED5         0.38 0.29 
          (0.52) (0.51) 
ISCED7         0.40 0.30 
          (0.52) (0.52) 
Othereducation         0.92 0.90 
          (0.59) (0.61) 
ISCO2           0.14 
            (0.47) 
ISCO3           -0.41 
            (0.52) 
ISCO5           -0.09 
            (0.38) 
Otheroccupation           0.05 
            (0.46) 
Sample Core Core Core Core Core Full 
N 124 124 124 124 124 124 
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Prob>chi2 0.2955 0.2049 0.1855 0.2101 0.1225 0.1708 
Pseudo R2 0.0023 0.0079 0.0114 0.0162 0.0272 0.0311 
Constant             
Cut1 -1.45 -1.91 -1.50 -1.16 -0.41 -0.62 
  (0.37) (0.49) (0.52) (0.58) (0.77) (0.94 
Cut2 -0.66 -1.12 -0.65 -0.35 0.40 0.20 
  (0.35) (0.47) (0.51) (0.57) (0.77) (0.94) 
Cut3 0.21 -0.24 0.22 0.53 1.30 1.10 
  (0.34) (0.47) (0.51) (0.57) (0.76) (0.95) 
Cut4 0.65 0.20 0.67 0.98 1.77 1.57 
  (0.35) (0.47) (0.51) (0.58) (0.77) (0.95) 
Cut5 1.01 0.57 1.04 1.36 2.17 1.97 
  (0.34) (0.48) (0.52) (0.58) (0.78) (0.96) 
Cut6 1.32 0.89 1.36 1.69 2.50 2.31 
  (0.32) (0.45) (0.49) (0.54) (0.77) (0.93) 
Cut7 1.63 1.20 1.68 2.01 2.83 2.65 
  (0.35) (0.45) (0.50) (0.55) (0.77) (0.94) 
Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: The extent of corruption in society         
Explanatory variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mpesasoc -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Gender   -0.35 -0.36 -0.37 -0.43 -0.43 
    (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (0.49) (0.49) 
Young     0.35 -0.47 0.48 0.33 
      (1.29) (1.33) (1.38) (.140) 
Middle     0.51 0.66 0.67 0.39 
      (1.36) (1.40) (.148) (1.50) 
Income1       0.18 0.22 0.45 
        (0.59) (0.60) (0.66) 
Incom2       0.45 0.54 0.58 
        (0.69) (0.68) (0.65) 
Income3       -0.24 -0.11 -0.01 
        (0.59) (0.60) (0.63) 
ISCED2         1.08 1.28 
          (0.94) (0.94) 
ISCED5         0.91 0.92 
          (0.88) (0.88) 
ISCED7         1.14 1.20 
          (0.92) (0.92) 
Othereducation         2.34** 2.58** 
          (1.18) (1.23) 
ISCO2           2.24 
            (1.55) 
ISCO3           0.50 
            (1.66) 
ISCO5           0.61 
            (1.51) 
Otheroccupation           0.32 
            (1.60) 
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Sample Core Core Core Core Core Full 
N 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Prob>F 0.1278 0.2551 0.5859 0.8046 0.6610 0.2987 
R-squared 0.0147 0.0183 0.0192 0.0249 0.0394 0.0697 
Root MSE 2.8904 2.8936 2.9096 2.9275 2.9417 2.9319 
Constant 21.33*** 21.89*** 21.55*** 21.25*** 20.13*** 19.63*** 
  (0.87) (1.19) (1.80) (1.91) (2.21) (2.77) 
Table XX: Correlation between variables included in corruption individual. Note: Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10%(*), 5% (**), 1% (***) confidence level. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Questionnaire - Your opinions count!   
We are two master’s students from Lund University in 
Sweden currently writing our master’s thesis on Mobile 
Banking in Kenya. This questioner will help us get a better understanding of whether Mobile Banking has 
an impact on the society in Kenya.   
 
Please mark one of the following boxes on each line that indicates how much you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statements and questions.   
 
Important! This survey is confidential and your identity will remain anonymous 
 
Theme 1 – Personal questions   
 
1. Gender  
 
Male  Female  
 
2. Age 
 
 
3. Income (per month in KSh)  
 
 
 
4. Level of education  
 
 
 
 
 
Theme 2 – Mobile banking  
 
1. Do you have a mobile phone?  
 
Yes   No 
 
2. Are you a M-pesa user?  
 
Yes   No 
 
 
 
0-17  18-25  26-33      34-41 42-48  49-56  57- 
0-3000        3001-6000         6001-9000 9001-12000 12001-15000    15001-18000   18001 or more 
No education  Primary Secondary Tertiary Post-Graduate               Other 
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3. Do you have a bank account? 
 
Yes   No 
 
4. What is your the main purpose of your M-pesa: You are allowed marking one or more answers  
 
☐ Transfer money to other people   Pay bills  
  Savings      Buy goods and service 
  Receive Wages     Withdraw from ATM  
  Pay Wages      Receive Payments 
  Buy Airtime       Make donations 
  Use when travelling     Other____________________________ 
 
5. How big was your last transaction (KSh)?  
 
 
 
 
6. How big was your second last transaction (KSh)?  
 
 
 
7. How often do you use M-pesa?  
 
 
 
8. When did you start using M-pesa?  
 
 
 
9. Why don’t you use M-pesa?  
 
 
Theme 3 – Working Force  
1. What is your primary occupation?___________________________________________________  
 
 
Every day                  2-4 times/week                   Less than 3 times/month           Less than 1 time/month 
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011      2012 2013     2014  
0-3000        3001-6000         6001-9000 9001-12000 12001-15000    15001-18000   18001 or more 
0-3000        3001-6000         6001-9000 9001-12000 12001-15000    15001-18000   18001 or more 
Don’t know        Its not       Mobile phones      I want to             it is           I want to   Its not private   Other  
how to use       secure       are stolen            meet the person     expensive     deal with   
m-pesa             personally        cash 
 
Master’s Thesis   Isabell Johannesson 
2014  Marina Steendam 
	   94	  
2.Do you work in the public sector?  
 
Yes    No 
 
    
If yes; please answer the questions below. If no; please continue to the questions under theme 4. 
4. Which sector do you work in? ___________________________________________________  
 
5. How sure are you that you will be able to keep your position/work in the future?  
 
 
 
 
 
6. Do you have friends in the public sector? 
 
Yes   No 
 
 
7. Do most of your friends have the same position as you have? 
 
Yes   No 
 
 
8. Do you have friends in other sectors?  
 
Yes   No 
 
A. If yes: Which sector?  
 
 
 
 
Theme 4 – Social Trust 
 
1. Do you agree that people in general can be trusted? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sure        Quite sure           Quite unsure   Unsure 
Media     Business            Juridical       Financial                Other 
 
Strongly agree              Agree           Neither agree   Disagree             Strongly Disagree  
             nor disagree  
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2. Is it possible for public employees to use their position of power for private gain without anyone 
noticing it?  
 
 
 
3.Is it easy for public employees at a higher level of position to use their power for private gain? 
 
 
 
4. Do you find that public employees in general are dishonest or self-serving?  
 
 
 
 
 
Theme 5 - Loyalty  
1.How often do you get offered payment, gifts or favors to perform a certain task within your work  
duties?  
 
 
 
 
2. How often would you accept it?  
 
 
 
3. How often would you demand it?  
 
 
Theme 6 - Expectations  
 
1. Is it likely that one can manage to get out of an inconvenient situation and avoid being fined or 
sentenced by offering a bribe?  
 
 
 
Very often            Often             Sometimes          Never 	  
Very Often   Often        Sometimes               Never 	  
Very likely                      Likely  Sometime                          Unlikely 
Very easy          Easy               Possible Difficult              Very Difficult  
Very easy          Easy               Possible Difficult              Very Difficult  
Very Much            Yes            To some  No  Never 
                                        extent 	  
Very often   Often            Sometime              Never 	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2. Is it likely that public employees demand a bribe as an opportunity for you to get out of a 
situation?  
 
 
 
 
Very likely         Likely                   Sometime           Unlikely 
	  
